CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

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FINAL RECORD OF THE FIVE HUNDRED AND NINETY-FIFTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 13 June 1991, at 10 a.m.

President: Miss Tessa A.H. Solesby (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland)

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The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 595th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

At the outset, I would like to extend a warm welcome on behalf of the Conference to the Minister for Disarmament and Arms Control of New Zealand, the Honourable Douglas Graham, who is addressing the Conference today as our first speaker. The Minister was first elected to Parliament in July 1984. In addition to his specific responsibilities in the field of disarmament, he also holds the portfolios of Justice and Arts and Culture. He has also been long active in academic life. I am sure that the Conference will follow his statement with particular interest.

I would also like to welcome the Honourable Madam Manae Kubota, who is at present with us at this plenary meeting, a member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the Upper House in Japan and Director of the Women's Division in the Office of the Prime Minister. Madam Kubota was also Director of the Women's Advancement Branch of the United Nations between 1978 and 1982.

I have on my list of speakers today the Minister for Disarmament and Arms Control of New Zealand, the Honourable Douglas Graham, as well as the representatives of Egypt, Austria and Bulgaria. The Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons will introduce a recommendation of the Ad Hoc Committee concerning intersessional work during the month of July.

After the list of speakers is concluded, I will put that recommendation before the Conference for adoption. We shall also take up for decision a request by a non-member State.

I now have great pleasure in giving the floor to the Minister for Disarmament and Arms Control of New Zealand, the Honourable Douglas Graham.

Mr. GRAHAM (New Zealand): It gives me great pleasure to address the Conference, for the first time, on behalf of New Zealand. It also gives me particular pleasure to see you in the Chair, Madam President. I am confident that under your leadership the Conference will make rapid progress on the issues before it.

I would like this morning to present New Zealand's views on some specific items on this Conference's agenda. Let me first, however make a few observations about disarmament and arms control in the changing international climate. There is wide recognition that changes in East/West relations, and more recently events in the Gulf, have opened a new chapter in international relations. We have the opportunity to make real progress towards a world where international peace and security are maintained by collective effort on the basis of the United Nations Charter. Was that after all not the hope of those far-sighted signatories to the Charter in 1945. We have also seen a counterpoint to that vision. Iraq's brutal invasion of Kuwait involved a total disregard of international law. We must strive together to prevent similar actions in the future by any nation.

(Mr. Graham, New Zealand)

Arms control is one of the most important tools we have to create a new world order - a world order in which the sovereignty of States is respected by others and guaranteed by the United Nations. Too often in the past arms control has been hostage to other political, and indeed economic, considerations. However, arms control is an essential and practical means to enhance security in a world where change and uncertainty abound. And, what is more, the peoples of the world now more than ever demand that we, their representatives, put aside our differencies and achieve long-lasting positive results in order to preserve the global peace. We have seen how arms control has helped improve confidence and security between East and West. The challenge is to project that globally.

New Zealand is a small country, fortunate to be distant from the major sources of international tension. But in an increasingly interdependent world our security, like that of other States, is affected by events well beyond our immediate area. My Goverment believes very strongly in international cooperation to enhance security. That is why we contributed to the collective security measures in the Gulf. That is also why we strongly support multilateral efforts for disarmament and arms control, and applaud successful bilateral negotiations when they occur. We intend to take a practical approach to these issues. Fine words and fine gestures are wasted if they do not result in progress where it counts. I hope nevertheless that we may be entering a period where idealism on the one hand, and realism on the other, will not be seen as mutually exclusive. It is vital to take advantage of the opportunities now offered by the transformation of East/West relations. The Gulf conflict has injected impetus into arms control and in particular on specific agenda items. The climate is right for positive action.

One challenge that must be resolutely faced is in the area of conventional weaponry. Despite the existence of weapons of mass destruction, it is conventional weapons which have caused almost all death and destruction in war. They also consume the bulk of the world's excessive military expenditure, which could so better be used to improve the lot of mankind. I am not talking about the modest level of forces which States legitimately have for defensive security purposes. But the ease with which a State can build up its forces well beyond these legitimate requirements is a different matter. For too long this aspect of arms control has been neglected. World opinion now expects us to make serious efforts to improve the situation. We have been given a lead by progress in Europe. The Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe is an important part of arrangements to enhance security and stability both in Europe and globally.

New Zealand warmly welcomes the CFE Treaty and the recent resolution of difficulties over its implementation. But we must ensure that disarmament in one region does not lead to rearmament in another. We fully support the consensus of last year's Disarmament Commission that the principal method of effecting reductions should be the destruction of equipment. The export of surplus equipment, or its redeployment to areas not covered by a particular treaty, only transfer the problems - and instability - elsewhere.

(Mr. Graham, New Zealand)

Dealing with disequilibriums in conventional weaponry is not an easy task. Greater openness about military capabilities is essential. The Vienna Document on confidence- and security-building measures offers some promise in this area. It may also embrace concepts which could be used by other regions as well, although regional problems obviously require measures tailored to those specific conditions. While the CFE Treaty may not be a model for other regions, it does demonstrate what can be done if countries have the political will to make progress.

I hope that States in other regions will take appropriate measures to enhance peace and security, through arms reductions, confidence-building and greater political cooperation. I look forward to further international consideration of these issues. I note in particular the useful role that the United Nations regional disarmament centres are playing in this area. New Zealand has been impressed for example with the discussions which have taken place under the auspices of the Asia/Pacific Centre in Kathmandu and will continue to support its work.

Fundamental to the problem of the massive accumulation of conventional weapons is their production and transfer between countries. We have seen what consequences can ensue from the uncontrolled flow of weapons into unstable regions where tensions run high. We need to develop new ways to provide transparency in the arms trade and restraint among suppliers and recipients. All States need to take greater national responsibility for the production and export of arms. Each State must ensure that international arms transfers do not result in insecurity and instability. We support the concept of a United Nations arms transfer register to bring transparency to the arms trade. Greater transparency would be an important confidence-building measure and would give warning of dangerous arms build-ups. This idea needs to receive serious and urgent consideration when the expert group assigned to study it reports back to the United Nations later this year.

New Zealand has only a low level of arms imports and exports. Nevertheless, we are more than willing to contribute to a United Nations register, as we do already to the United Nations questionnaire on military expenditure.

Transparency of itself is not sufficient however. It will never prevent the deliberate sale of armaments to potentially volatile regions if the projection of political power or commercial considerations are given priority. We therefore fully support proposals that those countries primarily involved in the supply of conventional arms address this problem in a coordinated way. Such coordination should promote mutual restraint so that the security of other States, and of the international community as a whole, is not jeopardized by transfers which exceed legitimate defence requirements. We do not pretend that this task will be easy. Nevertheless, global security demands nothing less.

The casualties of the Gulf war were not only human ones. The deliberate destruction of the environment is a terrible new development in modern warfare which has rightly attracted widespread international condemnation. While it

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may say little for human wisdom that many find the indiscriminate destruction of wildlife more horrific than the loss of human life, the oil-coated cormorant today has become a symbol of the very fragility of human existence in the modern world. The consequences of environmental warfare extend far beyond the countries immediately involved in conflict and the damage is not easily repaired. Although this issue is not strictly a matter of arms control, we must all ensure that the international community and international law are properly able to deal with this serious development. My Government will cooperate fully in endeavours to this end.

As disarmament and arms control loses some of its East/West focus, many of the problems we face can be resolved only through multilateral forums. The Conference on Disarmament should have a central role in this. New Zealand will do what it can to assist in a practical way. We have argued for some time, however, that the multilateral disarmament machinery must be made equal to the task before it. There have been some promising signs in that respect. The changes that have taken place in the United Nations Disarmament Commission are welcome, as is the continuing progress towards rationalizing the work of the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly.

I also welcome moves under way to improve the functioning of this Conference. I hope that further steps will be taken to make the agenda and procedures more flexible and responsive to the urgent needs of the 1990s. Lack of adequate progress on the nuclear testing issue, for example, led some States to establish an alterantive forum for discussion. It would indeed be tragic if this Conference were to be seen more as an obstacle to arms control in some areas than a catalyst for change. In particular the Conference needs to respond, in a flexible manner, to the question of its expanded membership. A final decision cannot be postponed indefinitely. We urge the Conference, taking into account recent changes in the political situation, to put into effect the decision taken in principle to increase its membership.

The area where we look for the most immediate results is chemical weapons. The urgent need for a global convention has been demonstrated yet again, this time by the Gulf War. Like others, New Zealand units with the multinational force faced exposure to possible chemical attack. Threats to use chemical weapons against civilians were particularly barbaric, and are a reminder to us all of the need to outlaw these dreadful weapons for all time. New Zealand is firmly committed to the conclusion of a comprehensive convention prohibiting chemical weapons. We are pleased to note the progress being made on a number of important issues, including the drafting of an appropriate definition of chemical weapons and the order of destruction of stockpiles.

It has been clear for some time that greater momentum needs to be given to the negotiations. We welcome President Bush's announcement that the United States will drop its right of retaliation and destroy all its chemical weapon stocks within 10 years of the convention coming into force. We hope that this will provide some of the necessary impetus for the early conclusion of the negotiations. We believe that further impetus may well be provided by a meeting at ministerial level of the CD at an appropriate time.

(Mr. Graham, New Zealand)

Drafting the convention is not, of course, an end in itself. For the convention to work it must attract the widest possible international support. It is therefore essential that the convention should not impose a burden, that for practical reasons, would tend to discourage smaller countries from acceding. This has implications in a number of areas, not least regarding the costs and complexitiy of the controls being established. There is no area in which this is more relevant than verification, particularly challenge inspections and the verification of legitimate chemical activity. Here we must find an appropriate balance between verification which is sufficient to provide confidence in the régime, but which does not place an undue burden on the States and industries concerned. I suggest that we should not be looking for - and cannot afford the burden of - a perfect régime. We need a sufficient régime - one that is sufficient to deter a would-be violator because there would be a real prospect of being detected. I know these concerns are shared by others.

It was consistent with these concerns that New Zealand's trial inspection, the results of which were tabled earlier this year, looked at means by which small countries with modest chemical industries could comply with the convention. It remains inevitable, however, that there will be substantial costs in implementing this convention. It will be necessary - but may not be easy - to come up with a wholly equitable formula to determine where they fall. It is true that countries will benefit from the enhanced security offered by the convention. However, in the IAEA context New Zealand, which has no nuclear industry at all, pays a safeguards contribution equivalent to that paid by six shielded countries, all of them larger than us, which operate 29 nuclear power plants between them. I do not believe that the present inequitable IAEA funding system is sustainable in the long run, and we must not sow the seeds for similar inequities in the chemical weapons convention.

The destruction of all chemical weapons is our ultimate objective. That is a huge and costly task, not the least because of the absolute necessity to protect the environment in the process. In our view these weapons ought to be destroyed in situ and subject to proper controls. In this respect we accept that the United States has acted openly and responsibly in endeavouring to alleviate concern about the destruction of chemical weapons at Johnston Atoll in the Pacific. Provided that the process continues to operate in an environmentally safe manner, we also accept that the chemical weapons stocks on the atoll should be destroyed there. Of fundamental importance to us, however, is the United States' assurance that there is no prospect of further stocks being brought into the region for destruction at Johnston Atoll.

Controlling the transfer of technology and components intended for chemical weapons production is one way of limiting the spread of the weapons themselves. We have recently expanded the list of chemical weapons precursors subject to export controls in New Zealand. New Zealand believes it is essential for Governments to work hand in hand with the private sector on these questions. In the chemical area, the New Zealand Government maintains close contact with the New Zealand Chemical Industry Council. We are pleased that the Council has recently taken self-regulatory steps in adopting a

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programme of "responsible care" similar to that in other countries. We also welcome initiatives by the United States and others to tighten controls on exports which contribute to the production of weapons of mass destruction. New Zealand already maintains controls on the export of strategic goods and is a participant in the Missile Technology Control Régime.

I would now like to turn to the question of nuclear weapons. This remains an issue of great concern to the New Zealand Government and to New Zealanders. For too long the inability of the nuclear-weapon States to cut their arsenals frustrated many countries, including my own. Our frustration was accentuated by the testing of nuclear weapons in the Pacific. Despite the improvement in East/West relations, this testing regrettably continues. We remain firmly opposed to it.

The legacy of those years will be with us for some time. The cost in terms of international trust is difficult to measure. However, the prospect of future progress in nuclear arms reductions requires us to look forward rather than backward. The recent achievements in the nuclear arms control negotiations are very welcome to New Zealand. After the crucial breakthrough made in the INF Treaty, the prospect of significant reductions in strategic nuclear weapons is now within our grasp. New Zealand hopes that hindrances to a START agreement will be speedily removed. The 1990s will, we hope, allow the nuclear-weapon States to make substantial reductions in the number of nuclear weapons. The trust and confidence engendered by such steps would, I believe, make a significant contribution to the building of a new world order. The responsibility for nuclear arms reductions falls primarily on the nuclear-weapon States. But all countries have a vital interest in this issue and must make a contribution.

Despite the encouraging progress in the bilateral arms control negotiations, there is continuing unease about the prospects of nuclear proliferation. As the danger of global nuclear conflict diminishes, it is unacceptable that we may face an increasing risk of nuclear weapons becoming a factor in regional conflict. We believe that in the aftermath of the Gulf war there should be a strengthened international commitment to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. New Zealand and other South Pacific countries have already shown our commitment to non-proliferation through the Treaty of Rarotonga which is an important regional measure.

At the global level the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty continues to play a crucial role. In our view the Treaty should continue in force indefinitely after 1995. Using the Treaty's extension as a lever to achieve concessions in other arms control areas, however well intended, is playing with stakes that are simply too high. The NPT is a key factor in the security of us all. It is too important to bargain away.

New Zealand believes that universal membership is important for the strength of the NPT. That is why we have welcomed France's decision, in principle, to accede to the Treaty. Equally we welcome the accession of Tanzania and Zambia. We hope that this will lead to the situation before long where all the nuclear-weapon States are members of the NPT, and where all of

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them participate in this Conference's Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban. We also support efforts to increase the effectiveness of the non-proliferation régime, including the application of full-scope safeguards to all nuclear transfers. It has therefore been a matter of particular concern to New Zealand that a country in our Asia/Pacific region with substantial nuclear facilities has until now declined to honour its treaty obligation to conclude a safeguards agreement. Bilateral disputes are no grounds for a party to ignore the obligations which it has undertaken vis-à-vis all other parties to the Treaty. I am pleased that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has now decided to conclude a standard safeguards agreement with the Agency. We look forward to the completion of an un unconditional agreement as soon as possible.

I shall be speaking this afternoon in the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban, where I shall set out New Zealand's position on nuclear testing in detail. This has been a long-standing concern for New Zealand Governments. The need for a comprehensive test ban has not diminished. Indeed, increasing world concerns about the potential spread of nuclear weaponry make it all the more important for the nuclear-weapon States to agree to a total test ban. The technical aspects of a nuclear test ban have always been important. That is why we participate in the Ad Hoc Seismic Group and in the Group's technical test, the full-scale phase of which was completed only a few days ago. I shall be introducing in the Ad Hoc Committee a discussion paper on the verification of a CTB, which I hope will contribute to consideration of that topic.

The events of the last few years have created a window of opportunity to make progress in disarmament and arms control which has not been seen before. We have the vision to know what must be done. We must now have the determination to see that it is done. Recently the world community united together to face a common threat. It acted resolutely to meet the challenge. It is my hope that this Conference will produce the same cooperation and determination as we jointly seek a better world for this and future generations. I can assure you of New Zealand's commitment to that end.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the Minister for Disarmament and Arms Control of New Zealand for his important statement and also for the kind words. The next speaker on my list is the representative of Egypt, Ambassador Elaraby, to whom, if I may, I would like to extend warm congratulations on his recent appointment to a new and important post. You have the floor, Ambassador Elaraby.

Mr. ELARABY (Egypt): Madam President, since this is the first time I have taken the floor this session, allow me to express my sincere congratulations to you on your assumption of the post of President of the Conference on Disarmament during this important period. Our two countries have enjoyed throughout two centuries close relations. Sometimes, if you will allow me to say so, they were too close. However, for many years now, I am happy to state, our two countries have enjoyed excellent relations. We are confident that with your well-known leadership and diplomatic skills you will be able to steer our proceedings to a successful conclusion, and in this

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context I would like to thank you for addressing congratulations to me on my assumption of the post of Permanent Representative in New York. It gives me great pleasure to express my delegation's appreciation to the Minister for Disarmament and Arms Control of New Zealand, the Honourable Douglas Graham, for his important statement.

This year's session of the Conference on Disarmament began in an atmosphere fraught with mixed feelings of hope and fear, anxiety and trepidation. Precious time was lost and our schedule was delayed. However, what is important to highlight at this stage is the special responsibility accorded our body as the single United Nations multilateral disarmament negotiating forum. It must be underscored that the Charter of the United Nations in its quest for the maintenance of international peace and security has recognized the organic link that exists between disarmament and world peace. We are duty-bound to continue our task expeditiously and embark on serious work covering all items on the agenda. The United Nations membership has bestowed upon us their trust, and the CD's performance is the focus of scrutiny and the subject of assessment. We must live up to our commitments and their expectations.

Two relevant shortcomings need to be highlighted and addressed in any appraisal dealing with improved and effective functioning of the work of the CD. The first centres on the definition of consensus, which is the basis for arriving at decisions in the CD. While rule 18 of the rules of procedure states that the Conference shall conduct its work and adopt its decisions by consensus, rule 25 stipulates that "the approval by consensus of reports shall not be interpreted as affecting in any manner the essential requirement that such reports must reflect faithfully the positions of all the members of the respective organs".

Consensus was, therefore, incorporated in the rules of procedure to ensure a democratic process of decision-making in our Conference. However, as we all realize, over the years it has been misinterpreted, misused, abused and overstretched. Any member can block our work by casting a negative vote. Not only so, but we have repeatedly witnessed, as well as lived under, the threat of a resort to a negative vote, which ultimately became sufficient to hinder our work. This process has lead to conferring the powers of veto on all members of the Conference on Disarmament. It meant not only blocking the final outcome of negotiations, but more regrettably, it frustrates any progress and renders the Conference on Disarmament helpless as well as stagnant. Consensus, in the view of my delegation, is a process to encourage compromise and accommodation in a spirit of mutual understanding and good will. It should not be constantly brandished to block meaningful progress.

The second point deals not with our modus operandi, as such, but with the raison d'être of the CD itself. It is well-known that the General Assembly has entrusted to the Conference on Disarmament special tasks as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum. The basic question I would like to pose is: How much does negotiation occur in our negotiating forum? Most of the ad hoc committees established under the aegis of the CD do not enjoy a negotiating mandate and are thereby reduced to the status of deliberative

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bodies. How different then is the CD from the UNDC, or from the First Committee of the General Assembly? In my intervention of 21 April 1988, I cautioned against this. In fact I clarified how important the CD is for the future of disarmament negotiations.

The net result has been that the international community has hitherto failed to translate the integrated approach contained in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament into binding, legal instruments, since the achievements of the CD have remained limited in nature and its balance sheet, I am afraid to say, unimpressive.

The accumulation of weapons of mass destruction, particularly in certain regions such as the Middle East, creates a destabilizing environment that endangers international peace and security. The spectre of the use of weapons of mass destruction impels us to redouble our efforts for the early conclusion of a comprehensive and verifiable chemical weapons convention and to address all other weapons of mass destruction. This should be done without delay in order to make our world a safer place to live in.

Egypt proposed on 8 April 1990, the declaration of the Middle East as a region free of all weapons of mass destruction. On 24 April 1990, I was instructed to introduce our proposal in the CD, and I stated on that occasion the following:

> "The rationale of the proposal is to spare a region fraught with tension from the scourge of a possible recourse to any type of weapon of mass destruction".

I went on to state in that same intervention:

> "It is the considered opinion of the Government of Egypt that the establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East merits urgent attention and serious examination. ... I believe a careful perusal of its contents will contribute to a better and more profound appreciation of our proposal. It is our earnest hope that this proposed comprehensive approach will command the active support of all ... States".

As of late, proposals have been announced by the United States and France which we hope will contribute to the attainment of this important objective. The Security Council has also adopted resolution 687, which recognized in paragraph 14 the necessity to establish such a zone. Paragraph 14 reads:

> "Takes note that the actions to be taken by Iraq in paragraphs 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13 of the present resolution represent steps towards the goal of establishing in the Middle East a zone free from weapons of mass destruction and all missiles for their delivery and the objective of a global ban on chemical weapons".

(Mr. Elaraby, Egypt)

Egypt considers the Security Council's reference to the proposal on weapons of mass destruction to be an acknowledgement of the merit of the Egyptian proposal. As a follow-up my delegation hopes that adequate machinery, as well as specific measures, under the supervision of the Security Council, will be soon undertaken. The Council may even discuss such measures during its upcoming meeting to review the steps taken by Iraq in the field of disarmament.

One further integral element that would facilitate the establishment of such a zone in the Middle East and ensure regional collective accession to it could be the encouragement of all States in the region to adhere to the international legal instruments that comprise the juridical régimes regulating weapons of mass destruction. These legal instruments are the non-proliferation Treaty, the biological weapons Convention of 1972 and the chemical weapons convention which is under preparation now at the CD. The successful employment of confidence-building measures in the Middle East will undoubtedly be augmented through the adherence of all parties in the region to these important legal instruments.

Last year a highly qualified group of experts appointed by the Secretary-General finalized and presented a study on effective and verifiable measures which could facilitate the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. The study noted in paragraph 110 that

> "there is broad agreement that an effective zone would be a great improvement over the present situation. The problem is how to create the conditions in which a zone becomes a realistic development".

This represents the basic challenge for the implementation of a stream of General Assembly resolutions that date back to 1974, when Egypt and Iran presented this proposal for the first time to the General Assembly and have been adopted by consensus at every General Assembly session since 1980.

I turn now to the NPT. Egypt attaches the utmost importance to the non-proliferation Treaty, the cornerstone of the non-proliferation régime. Towards the goal of strengthening and enhancing the NPT régime beyond 1995, my delegation addressed several important issues at the fourth NPT review conference, which convened here in Geneva last summer. The problems still confronting us, 23 years after the signing of the NPT, emanate from the fact that this treaty lacks universal adherence. Key States with significant nuclear programmes opted to remain outside the NPT, while others which do not possess similar significant nuclear programmes relinquished this option and joined the NPT. This asymmetrical approach to rights and obligations, especially in conflict-torn regions, has created a situation of ambiguity and uncertainty. The case of the Middle East is abundantly clear.

Additionally, the NPT does not provide for credible security assurances. The neutral and non-aligned States, not belonging to military alliances, are particularly vulnerable and feel the need for assurances from the international community.

(Mr. Elaraby, Egypt)

Egypt considers that the security dimension is of paramount importance for every non-nuclear-weapon State, particularly the neutral and non-aligned States. It is essential, therefore, to focus on the security aspects. It is generally recognized that there is no one single formula to provide security to non-nuclear-weapon States. Some States perceive that their security will be enhanced through acquiring negative security assurances from nuclear-weapon States through legally binding instruments. Nigeria presented to the fourth NPT review conference a proposal worthy of consideration. This proposal has its merits and would provide adequate assurances to many States. There is, however, an additional approach which Egypt is advocating. This approach tallies fully with the original Charter design of entrusting a central role to the Security Council in the maintenance of international peace and security. The positive assurances approach is anchored on the assumption that appropriate action by the Security Council will be forthcoming. The Council did adopt a rather truncated version of the positive approach in 1968 which merits closer examination.

It will be recalled that in the course of the General Assembly's resumed session in May 1968, many countries emphasized the importance of incorporating provisions for security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States in the NPT. This demand, however, was not looked upon with favour by the nuclear-weapon States. Consequently, the NPT did not contain a clause providing for security assurances. As a compromise, the issue of security assurances was referred to the Security Council, which, on 18 June 1968, adopted resolution 255.

The matter of highest concern to my delegation is to increase the effectiveness of that resolution and make it compatible with the realities of our contemporary world. This could be achieved by the adoption of the following measures: the expression of unequivocal resolve to adopt immediate procedures in order to deter a nuclear threat or nuclear aggression, a determination to act in accordance with the provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter against any aggressor, providing for more comprehensive assistance, including technical, financial, as well as humanitarian assistance to non-nuclear-weapon States subject to the use or the threat of the use of nuclear weapons, and finally the imposition of sanctions against any State party or non-party to the NPT which uses nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Treaty.

During the last NPT review conference, Egypt presented a proposal to this effect. The Conference, however, could not agree on a final document, and our proposal was, therefore, not formally adopted. However, we consider the finalization and the general agreement on its language to be a significant step that could pave the way for future consultations and hopefully actions between the parties concerned. The language of the agreed text was confined to a call on all nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty to conduct consultations collectively or individually with the nuclear-weapon States not currently party to the Treaty, on the issue of security assurances, taking into account Security Council resolution 255 of 1968, and to inform other States party to the Treaty of any progress on appropriate actions by the Council that may result from these efforts. Despite the modest language of

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this compromise agreement, Egypt considered it a sound basis and a point of departure for a process we hope will soon gain momentum. The prevailing propitious international climate could lend support to this outcome.

My delegation welcomes the work done so far in the Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons with a view to reaching agreement on a convention prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons, as well as reaching an agreement on the prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities. In the absence of a comprehensive agreement pertaining to the prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities, the ability of developing countries to securely and confidently make use of peaceful uses of nuclear energy will be substantially hindered.

Furthermore, one additional matter of highest concern to my delegation is that of radioactive waste. The dumping of radioactive waste in Africa has serious repercussions and a drastic impact on the health, welfare and environment of our continent. We therefore hope that the Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological weapons will endeavour to formulate the necessary modalities for studying the serious implications of this problem.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Egypt for his statement and also for his kind words. I now give the floor to the representative of Austria, Ambassador Ceska.

Mr. CESKA (Austria): President, it is with particular pleasure that I take the floor under your leadership. Your personal skills and engagement, your high profile in the field of disarmament are well known to all of us and the token for successful proceedings of the Conference on Disarmament. Furthermore, you are representing a country with which Austria has long-standing intensive relations of friendship.

May I start by expressing the deep satisfaction of my Government with regard to the recent initiative taken by President Bush in the field of chemical weapons? The unconditional renouncement of any use of chemical weapons upon entry into force of the chemical weapons convention expressed therein represents an important step towards the global abolition of this category of weapons. In this context, we are also aware of the importance of cooperation for the destruction of chemical weapons as requested by the United States initiative. At the same time, we are in favour of intensifying the negotiations - in their quantitative as well as qualitative aspects - with a view to finalizing the draft convention within the coming 12 months.

Besides the above-mentioned questions, there are still a number of other issues under discussion which also require political settlement apart from technical solutions. In particular, I am referring to the questions of verification and decision-making. The essential problem we are facing in the field of verification relates to the identification of objective criteria to allow for inclusion of the most relevant facilities and installations into the control régime. In this context, we support the concept of "capability" as an essential criterion, while, at the same time, we agree with those who argue in favour of restricting this concept to the most relevant facilities and

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installations capable of producing schedule 1, 2 and 3 chemicals. This should satisfy both the political and technical needs with regard to the scope of verification. Politically speaking, this would help to overcome reluctance displayed by industry representatives as well as by countries hosting a large number of chemical facilities and installations. Furthermore, financial implications could be kept to an acceptable level. From the technical point of view, such a further selection would help "separate the wheat from the chaff".

Concerning the decision-making mechanism to be adopted under the future convention, let me refer to three principles which seem the most crucial. They relate to the questions of geographical distribution of seats, transparency and flexibility. In the light of the regional as well as global interests of all States, all regions of the world should be adequately represented in the pattern of decision-making. In this regard, the number of seats in the executive organ of the control organization could be limited to 20, using a commonly acceptable mechanism for the selection of candidates. Such a system could, however, comprise some additional criteria in order to allow for more frequent representation of highly concerned States.

In order to ensure comprehensive confidence in the work of the organization, maximum transparency in the decision-making process would be required. This has also to be guaranteed in all other areas of work of the future organization, taking into account, however, information restrictions due to commercial secrecy requirements and security interests involved.

The necessity for flexibility relates to the need for swift political and organizational reaction. A changing international environment as well as rapid advances in science and technology necessitate the flexible application as well as interpretation of the convention. In view of the security interests involved, the administrative side of the organization should also be handled in a flexible manner, ensuring comprehensive satisfaction of particular security concerns. Consequently, in order to meet these requirements, the future control organization should dispose of adequate information and evalutation machinery.

Let me welcome the important initiative recently taken by President Mitterrand of France which contains proposals relating to weapons of mass destruction as well as other categories of weapons. In particular the proposed acceleration of the CW negotiations and their possible conclusion, still in 1991, by a ministerial meeting are aimed at intensifying the negotiations in order to bring them to an early end. We likewise welcome the decision of the French Government to join the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, thereby strengthening it decisively.

Let me reiterate once more that my country attaches the utmost importance to the achievement of a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons. It is with this understanding that Austria has intensified its commitment to the negotiating process and continues to offer to serve as host country for the

(Mr. Ceska, Austria)

future control organization. In this context, let me give more details of our understanding of the role of the future control organization as well as our offer.

The future control organization will have to exercise a number of different functions in order to allow for comprehensive and forward-looking implementation of the convention. One of these functions relates to verification activities in the large sense, including periodic updating of verification means and related methodology. In this regard, the establishment of a special unit dealing with science-and-technology-related issues would seem appropriate. Another area of activity would cover peaceful cooperation in the field of chemistry, which would largely constitute a clearing-house function. Furthermore, education programmes for inspectors as well as students and the broad public could be envisaged.

Let me mention one more idea, which relates to the question of environmental protection. As is often pointed out in the context of destruction of chemical weapons, minimum environmental standards will have to be observed. As the future day-to-day work of the organization will allow for collection of comprehensive environmental knowledge also in other areas, a specific environmental unit might be created. This unit could help foster international cooperation programmes in the specific environmental context of highly toxic chemicals, drawing also on existing knowledge within WHO.

Thus, in our view the future control organization should be a comprehensive and easily accessible servicing body of the international community of States. For this purpose, its location should allow for optimum cooperation and coordination with other relevant international bodies and the international community as a whole. Excellent working conditions including generous privileges and immunities should render this task as easy as possible. Austria is prepared to offer such conditions, comprising equivalent treatment for the staff of the organization as well as for the permanent missions accredited to the organization equivalent to those of bilateral missions, as a contribution to the future success of the work of the organization.

Turning now to the forthcoming third review conference of the biological weapons Convention taking place in Geneva in September this year, let me start with some general remarks. In our understanding, the biological weapons régime as contained in the Convention has proved satisfactory. At the second review conference in 1986, the time was not felt to be ripe to take action on institutional as well as other questions in the light of the then expected conclusion of the chemical weapons convention negotiations. In the mean time the then prevailing expectation concerning the possibility of simply merging the chemical weapons convention and the biological weapons Convention implementation institutions has proven unfeasible, as at least a specialized unit dealing with biological-weapons-related issues seems needed. Consequently, precise proposals could now be foreseen in order to allow for enhanced implementation of the biological weapons Convention while at the same time not excluding the possibility of integrating such a specialized unit into the future chemical weapons control organization.

(Mr. Ceska, Austria)

At the third review conference, special consideration will have to be given to questions relating to the implementation as well as to the possible extension of the confidence-building measures accepted in 1987. This enlargement of scope might even encompass legally binding verification measures. Such considerations will also have a direct bearing on institutional questions when considering enhanced organizational arrangements.

Another question relates to the national implementation of the confidence-building measures and to the processing of information obtained. In light of the health-related content of the information thus provided, as well as knowledge already gained by WHO regarding chemical and biological weapons, the enlargement of tasks in this field by WHO might be considered. This might be done in the form of strengthening the existing special unit within WHO dealing with chemical weapons and biological-weapons-related issues.

As far as future institutional arrangements are concerned, the starting point might be found in the form of a small secretariat unit, possibly within the United Nations Disarmament Department. At the same time, the establishment of a preferably open-ended committee of States parties dealing with implementation questions could be envisaged. For any questions regarding compliance, the existing consultative mechanism would seem the appropriate forum of action.

Since the successful conclusion of the chemical weapons negotiations can now be foreseen, it seems appropriate to tackle the question of reservations to the Geneva Protocol of 1925. This could take the form of a special meeting of States parties dealing solely with implementation questions with regard to the Protocol. On this occasion, a solemn declaration could be adopted endorsing the withdrawal of all reservations to the Geneva Protocol as soon as possible, but in any case not later than at the time of entry into force of the chemical weapons convention. Such a step would undoubtedly enhance the security of all States and thereby support efforts towards universal adherence to all three legal instruments.

Let me conclude by expressing satisfaction that the full and unconditional implementation of the treaty on conventional force reductions in Europe seems now well on its way, thereby allowing us to proceed to negotiations on a second treaty foreseeing even deeper cuts in conventional armaments as well as reductions of existing military structures.

Likewise, I would express my sincere hope that the forthcoming summit meeting between Presidents Bush and Gorbatchev will allow for the awaited signing of the START agreement. In view of this development, we are encouraged to expect further steps in nuclear disarmament and arms control in the foreseeable future.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Austria for his statement and also for his kind words. I now give the floor to the representative of Bulgaria, Ambassador Ditchev.

Mr. DITCHEV (Bulgaria): Madam President, it is a privilege for me to address the Conference on Disarmament during your presidency. Let me congratulate you on this occasion and express confidence that your guidance will help us advance considerably our work. I assure you of the full support of my delegation, which believes that in spite of recent developments which might have reduced the feeling of urgency shared by many countries before, arms control and disarmament preserves its important place in world politics and international relations.

I hardly need to say much to substantiate such a conclusion. The very fact that in the course of this year the Conference on Disarmament has been addressed by quite a number of high-ranking government officials, including the first speaker of today, the distinguished Minister for Disarmament and Arms Control of New Zealand, the Honourable Douglas Graham - all that testifies to the interest of States in advancing disarmament. And rightly so. Arms control and disarmament have always been related to security. New developments, however positive they are, do not seem to have changed yet the nature of this fundamental relationship. Small countries in particular - Bulgaria is no exception in this regard - are naturally interested in options for improving national security that emerge in the arms control process.

In the aftermath of the Gulf war, non-proliferation objectives with respect to weapons of mass destruction and missile technology have acquired added international importance. We share the view that proliferation of such weapons and unrestricted transfers of conventional armaments undermine international security and increase the risk of armed conflicts. It may be expected that in the foreseeable future these issues will be treated with higher attention, both bilaterally and multilaterally, including in global disarmament forums.

Recently, the Bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a declaration of support for the latest initiative of President Bush concerning the Middle East. The declaration expresses, inter alia, the belief that this initiative could have a much broader impact on efforts aimed at strengthening peace and security on a global scale. I also wish to inform you in this connection that steps are currently being undertaken in Bulgaria to introduce a comprehensive national system of export control. We are seeking to use the experience acquired by other countries in this field. The aim is to contribute to the viability of the existing internationally agreed guidelines trying to curb the proliferation of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons and missile technologies. Speaking about non-proliferation, I would also like to welcome the decision of France to accede to the NPT. We regard this development as a major contribution to the viability of the treaty and to international security as a whole. My delegation listened with great attention to the statement of the distinguished Ambassador of France, Ambassador Errera, introducing the arms control and disarmament plan put forward some days ago by President Mitterrand. We find that this plan contains a number of valuable ideas which will be thoroughly examined, no doubt in positive terms.

(Mr. Ditchev, Bulgaria)

Today I wish to address the agenda item dealing with chemical weapons. I shall start by saying that Bulgaria is much interested in the early conclusion of a chemical weapons convention. It is in this context that we consider positively the recent initiative of President Bush. Bulgaria cannot but welcome this initiative, as we have always favoured the idea of speeding up the work on the CW convention, including through continuous negotiations. In the view of the Bulgarian delegation, it is entirely within reach to have all outstanding issues resolved by the end of 1991 and the convention completed within 12 months.

Unilaterally at the 1989 Paris CW conference, and together with the other CSCE countries at the 1990 Paris summit meeting, Bulgaria has declared its intention to become an original party to the chemical weapons convention. We therefore support the United States call upon all States to do likewise and to declare their chemical weapons stockpiles. My country has entered a process of intensive national preparations to meet well in time its future obligations. A proposal has been tabled in the Bulgarian Council of Ministers for setting up a national commission to prepare for accession of the country to the convention. This commission may well turn later on into a national authority as provided for under article VII of the chemical weapons convention.

The formal renunciation by the United States of America of the use of chemical weapons for any reason, including retaliation, conforms with the will of all other States participating in the negotiations, Bulgaria included. We have always insisted that article I of the future convention should contain the obligation not to use chemical weapons under any circumstances. Accordingly, our Government is in a process of withdrawal of the reservation of Bulgaria to the 1925 Geneva Protocol made a long time ago. We welcome also the new unconditional United States commitment to destroy all of its chemical weapon stocks and production facilities within 10 years of entry into force of the convention. Inclusion of such provisions seems to hold the highest promise of speeding up the finalization of the convention. The United States' expressed readiness to provide assistance to other States in the speedy, safe and environmentally sound destruction of all existing stockpiles of chemical weapons is another positive step which may facilitate the successful completion of this process within the envisaged 10 years.

My delegation believes that the proposal to forswear the trade in CW-related materials with States with which are not parties to the convention may need some further clarification. The "rolling text" already contains the provision that transfer of schedule 1 chemicals may be done only between States parties to the convention. As of now, this provision does not apply to the chemicals under the remaining two schedules. A closer look at the draft text of article XI may also be needed. It is clear, however, that inclusion of a consensus provision of this kind in the convention would encourage more States to join the convention, and would therefore contribute to achieving its universality.

(Mr. Ditchev, Bulgaria)

Bulgaria will support inclusion of provisions for sanctions against those States which violate the convention, and especially for severe sanctions against any State that initiates the use of chemical weapons. We are also committed to a strong verification régime, with challenge inspection being one of its main elements. Once the promised new proposals by the United States are made we shall define our position on the matter.

Finally, the delegation of Bulgaria has been happy to note the prompt and positive reaction of the Soviet Union to the United States proposals, as expressed in the plenary statement of the Soviet delegation on 23 May. This is yet another evidence that the necessary prerequisites for early conclusion of the CW convention are being created. We are confident that the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons will be in a position, under the able guidance of its chairman, Ambassador Serguei Batsanov, to accomplish this task.

My delegation will take an active stand in the negotiations on these and all other remaining issues. In the present new context of the negotiations, we appreciate even more the idea of calling a CW meeting at the level of foreign ministers in Geneva to help finally solve all the pending political issues of the CW convention.

In conclusion, I should like to stress the following. You, Madam President, are guiding the work of the Conference on Disarmament at a time when the negotiations on CW have entered probably the most difficult and also the most rewarding stage. An early and successful outcome of these negotiations is to add to the credibility of this forum and demonstrate again that it is able to deal with and resolve in an effective way most complex and sensitive issues related to security. It is a time of unprecedented opportunities which we all should use to the maximum of our abilities.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Bulgaria for his statement and also for his kind words. I now give the floor to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, Ambassador Batsanov of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Mr. BATSANOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): You have called upon me, Madam President, in my capacity as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. However, first of all, as the head of the Soviet delegation, I should like to sincerely congratulate you on taking up the post of President and to express our great appreciation of the very effective manner in which you are directing the work of the Conference. I also consider it necessary to state that your leadership, among other things, has had a positive impact on the resolution of several issues now before the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. Actually, it is in connection with one such issue that I have asked to take the floor. I should like to present to the Conference a recommendation which was adopted yesterday by consensus in the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons and which has been distributed here today as document CD/CW/WP.343. This is an Ad Hoc Committee document dated 12 June. It calls for the Ad Hoc Committee to hold an additional regular session during the period from 8 to 19 July, that is, right

(Mr. Batsanov, USSR)

up to the beginning of the third part of the session of the Conference on Disarmament. The necessity for this additional session arises out of the fact that the work of the Ad Hoc Committee has entered a new stage, which requires the significant intensification of negotiations in order to achieve progress towards the early completion of the convention on chemical weapons. This recommendation adopted yesterday by the Ad Hoc Committee should not, in the view of the participants in the CW negotiations, pre-judge any possible further decisions regarding work during the period following the conclusion of the third part of the Conference on Disarmament, which is scheduled for the beginning of September. Consultations are still under way on this question. I should like to express the hope that the Conference on Disarmament will adopt our recommendation, which would then provide the "legal basis" required to continue negotiations on chemical weapons during the second and third weeks of July.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons for introducing the recommendation contained in document CD/CW/WP.343. We shall be returning to that question later. I would now like to give the floor to the representative of India, Ambassador Chadha.

Mr. CHADHA (India): Madam President, as this is the first time I am taking the floor under your presidency, may I begin by extending to you my warm felicitations upon your assumption of this office and best wishes for a successful and fruitful term? I gives us particular pleasure to see a representative from the United Kingdom, a country with which India has very close ties, occupying the Chair at this crucial stage of our deliberations in the Conference on Disarmament. I would also like to join the earlier speakers in welcoming in our midst the Honourable Douglas Graham, Minister for Disarmament and Arms Control of New Zealand. I would like to thank him, in particular, for the interest he has shown in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban, which I have the honour to chair, and we indeed look forward to listening to him this afternoon.

I have asked for the floor only to make a very brief statement on some recent positive developments which we believe would give an impetus to the negotiations which are now under way on chemical weapons at the Conference on Disarmament. I am referring to the statement made by President Bush on 13 May 1991 formally forswearing the use of chemical weapons for any reason against any State and unconditionally committing the United States to the destruction of its chemical weapons stocks within 10 years of the entry into force of a chemical weapons convention. The Government of India has already welcomed this statement, which, we believe, will make a crucial and important contribution to the negotiations on the chemical weapons convention. India is strongly opposed to chemical weapons and has a long-standing commitment to the total worldwide elimination of chemical weapons and to outlawing their use unconditionally. To this end, India fully supports the call made by President Bush for an intensification of our negotiations here at Geneva in order to resolve all outstanding issues by the end of this year and to complete this convention by mid-1992. India will contribute in every possible manner to achieve the objectives of the total renunication of chemical weapons, the commitment not to use chemical weapons under any circumstances

(Mr. Chadha, India)

and the destruction of all existing chemical weapons stockpiles. We will support the efforts of all like-minded delegations in the CD to these ends.

As my delegation has had occasion to state on many occasions in the past, a convention that can enjoy universal adherence must be non-discriminatory and must provide for equal rights and obligations of all States, whether or not they possess chemical weapons. It must contain an effective system of verification that reassures all States parties about compliance. The convention should ensure the unimpeded right of the States parties to develop, produce, use, exchange and transfer chemicals and technology for peaceful purposes and not hinder or impede international cooperation in peaceful areas of chemical industry development. The ideal way to ensure universal adherence to this convention is to make it attractive for those who join it. To this end, the interests of those who possess chemical weapons must be matched by the interests of those who do not and who will accept curbs on their chemical industry, which plays an important role in their development in the hope of achieving enhanced security. The routine verification system which will be developed must therefore ensure that the need for compliance is centred around the chemical industry itself, is focused, is easily implementable and is affordable. The issue of challenge inspection in the negotiations on the chemical weapons convention has now been discussed for a number of years. We believe that once a request for challenge inspection is received, the area of interest is enlarged and becomes the concern of all States parties, who are then legitimately involved in seeking reassurance that the convention is not being violated. The multilateral character of challenge inspection therefore needs to be ensured. The interests of security in the chemical weapons convention will have to be matched with the objectives of development. I am sure that all delegations negotiating on this issue in the CD share our sense of urgency and realize that the chemical weapons negotiations are at a critical stage. All efforts should be made to achieve our goal and India will fully support and complement endeavours towards this end.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of India for his statement and also for his kind words, and perhaps now we can return to the document CD/CW/WP.343, the recommendation of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons concerning the holding of an additional regular session, of limited duration, of the Ad Hoc Committee during the period 8 to 19 July. I propose that we now take action on that recommendation. If there is no objection, I shall consider that the Conference adopts the recommendation of the Ad Hoc Committee.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: The secretariat shall inform the Division of Conference Services of the United Nations Office at Geneva, accordingly.

The Conference also has before it document CD/WP.406, containing a note by the President on a request addressed to us by a non-member State, concerning participation in the work of the Conference. As on previous occasions, I have already informed the coordinators that no objection had been received to that request. This being the case, may I suggest that we deal with the request directly at this formal plenary meeting? There seems to be

(The President)

no need now for an informal meeting, it being of course understood that this action does not set a precedent for the future consideration of requests from non-members. I shall now proceed to the adoption of the draft decision.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: The Permanent Mission of Ireland will be informed of this decision.

We shall now proceed to consider the timetable of meetings to be held next week by the Conference and its subsidiary bodies. The timetable has been circulated in an informal paper and is merely indicative and subject to change, if needed. If I hear no objection, I shall consider that the Conference adopts the timetable.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: I have no other business for this plenary meeting. Before adjourning it, may I recall that, in accordance with the timetable for this week and the decision taken at the end of our last plenary meeting, the Conference shall hold an informal meeting on the substance of agenda items 2, "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament" and 3, "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters", immediately after this plenary meeting?

The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 20 June, at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 11.45 a.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.596
20 June 1991

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE FIVE HUNDRED AND NINETY-SIXTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 20 June 1991, at 10 a.m.

President: Miss Tessa A.H. Solesby (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland)

GE.91-61385/3303B

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 596th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

Before we proceed with our business for today, I have pleasure in informing the Conference that at the informal meeting on the substance of agenda item 3, scheduled to be held immediately after this plenary meeting, the representatives of the nuclear and space talks, Ambassador Lintton Brooks of the United States and Ambassador Yuri Nazarkin of the Soviet Union, will brief members on their ongoing negotiations. I am sure that we will all welcome this opportunity to become acquainted with the present position of their talks on such vital matters.

As members are aware, consultations have successfully been concluded on a draft decision relating to the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. Therefore, once the list of speakers is exhausted, I intend to put before the Conference for adoption the draft decision contained in document CD/WP.407.

I have on my list of speakers today the representatives of Morocco, Myanmar, Mongolia and Argentina. I now give the floor to the representative of Morocco, Ambassador Benhima.

Mr. BENHIMA (Morocco) (translated from French): First of all, Madam President, I should like to congratulate you on the skill and competence with which you have guided our work, confirming the distinguished qualities we have long known you to possess. I should also like to congratulate your predecessor in the Chair, Ambassador Batsanov.

At a time when initiatives from various sources have reminded us of the twofold necessity of disarmament and arms control, we cannot fail to note that after more than a decade the Conference has scant accomplishments to its credit, except for the progress achieved thus far in the elaboration of the convention on chemical weapons. We cannot contest the energy devoted by the Conference to implementing its mandate; but the meagre results neither reflect the efforts that have been made nor confirm the felicitous development of international relations that has marked the end of the cold war. The Conference thus faces a veritable challenge. That challenge must be met inter alia by adopting a global approach to the agenda and granting more sustained attention to priorities. Nuclear issues are among those priorities. An in-depth review of these still comes up against irreconcilable differences stemming from the order of priorities in which nuclear disarmament should be explored. Is deadlock a better solution than the resolute political commitment necessary to meet a challenge of this magnitude?

The scope of the INF Treaty cannot of course be underestimated, even though it affects only a modest part of current nuclear arsenals. Naturally we must welcome its implementation on schedule. But we remain seriously concerned about the use of the dismantled warheads. We feel that only the destruction of those warheads would give this Treaty its true historical scope and make it the first nuclear disarmament agreement capable of fostering new hopes in this field.

(Mr. Benhima, Morocco)

The international community has followed the START negotiations with great interest and has appreciated the substantial progress that has been achieved there. We hope that the technical difficulties that have recently appeared will soon be overcome, to allow the conclusion of an agreement on major cuts in strategic nuclear weapons. We should like to hope that this agreement will mark a decisive advance towards reduction of their potential by all the nuclear Powers. By virtue of its mandate, the Conference should be brought into this process to create propicious conditions for elaborating an agreement on cessation of the arms race for this type of weapon. It should set up the necessary machinery without delay to stimulate efforts and initiatives in this field. The manner in which we are currently discussing these issues calls for a new approach given the scope of the task that still remains to be achieved.

A few weeks ago we welcomed the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban. This Committee, which, under the chairmanship of Ambassador Chadha, has focused on the structure and scope of a possible prohibition of nuclear tests, as well as the related verification methods, has prompted great hopes since such a ban is undoubtedly the cornerstone of any effort aimed at nuclear disarmament. That is all the more obvious in that their continuation - aside from the fact that it has reduced confidence and generated new environmental problems - forms part of the escalation in the refinement of armaments and thus nullifies the efforts made in the field of vertical nuclear arms reduction. Hence, there is an urgent need to come to grips with this problem by embarking on genuine negotiations aimed at prohibiting such tests. Otherwise it would be futile to aspire to putting an end to the proliferation of nuclear armaments. I should like in this connection to convey my delegation's congratulations to the French delegation following the announcement of France's intention to accede to the NPT.

The Conference is energetically renewing its efforts to find political common ground which will result in a convention on chemical weapons within a reasonable time-frame. At the present stage, sustained commitment would go a long way towards overcoming outstanding problems. The decision of the United States to forswear all recourse to chemical weapons in any circumstances, including reprisals, as well as the decision to destroy all stock-piles and all production facilities completely within 10 years after the convention enters into force, will doubtless - this is our hope - have a positive impact on the ongoing negotiations.

Ever since the idea was suggested, the convening of a conference at ministerial level has continued to arouse interest, even if views are divided as to the role that should be entrusted to it and the scope of its decisions at this phase of the negotiations. We support the proposal but consider that, in view of what is at stake, such a conference should be carefully prepared for so as to ensure the best possible conditions for success, notably through the reduction of the remaining differences on major issues or fundamental principles governing the rights and duties of all parties.

The system of verification stemming from the provisions of the convention should be based on mutual trust. We are of the view that verification is

(Mr. Benhima, Morocco)

necessary and indispensable given the relative ease with which such weapons spread. However, this should not lead us to create an over-intrusive system that will prove to be a disincentive by being too demanding. Verification should be based on scrupulous and efficient measures, but without turning into a sort of unbridled intrusion in the inspected area, or simply involving prohibitive costs which would impair the ability of the ad hoc body to carry out its mandate satisfactorily. In this connection, the institution entrusted with monitoring the application of the convention should be fully representative of that universality we seek so that it can perform its task with all due impartiality. The developing countries should have an assurance that they will benefit from chemical technologies that are destined for civilian use.

Before concluding this chapter, I should like to commend the intensive work undertaken by the Committee on Chemical Weapons during the previous session under the active and skilled leadership of Ambassador Hyltenius, whom we thank for the efforts made in the elaboration of the convention. Ambassador Batsanov, who is pursuing that task with devotion and intelligence, also deserves our tribute.

The prevention of the arms race in outer space is among the most crucial issues on which the Conference's effectiveness will one day be determined. The subject has become more and more important in view of the rapid development of space exploration technology and especially the increasingly obvious desire to use space for military purposes. In the face of this threat, we must do our utmost to safeguard this common heritage of mankind from the slightest risk of militarization. It is clear that space studies must be encouraged and programmes for the peaceful use of outer space supported. The legal void surrounding the use of space must be filled as rapidly as possible.

For a number of years we have been involved in discussions to create propicious conditions for improving the functioning and effectiveness of the Conference and for finding appropriate solutions to the existing deadlocks. In this context we must devote ourselves to a better definition of the concept of consensus by delineating all its contours. The rule of consensus guarantees that the various schools of thought within the Conference will be taken into consideration, but it should also involve a painstaking search for compromise on issues on the agenda and avoid being transformed into a pretext for blocking any possibility of progress in our work. We believe that the flexible application of the consensus rule can produce positive results. In this connection allow me to congratulate Ambassador Kamal, who is leading our consultations on this issue with great skill.

The world has recently become acutely aware of the dangers of the build-up of weapons of mass destruction; the magnitude of these dangers in the Middle East has been particularly underscored in this forum. The American proposals on arms control in the Near and Middle East (29 May 1991) and the arms control and disarmament plan presented by France (3 June 1991) are valuable contributions to an in-depth review of the best way to implement the various aspects of these two initiatives. The major Powers, and particularly

(Mr. Benhima, Morocco)

the United States and the Soviet Union, now agree that global security can be achieved through the strengthening of the role of the United Nations. Recently President Bush, in a statement on 6 March 1991, spoke of "a world where the United Nations, free from the cold-war stalemate, is poised to fulfil the historic vision of its founders". Let us then see to it that the Conference, which is the sole multilateral negotiating organ in the field of disarmament, becomes truly both the framework for the settlement of difficult issues and issues of global interest and also the instrument that can properly serve the cause of peace through disarmament.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Morocco for his statement and also for his kind words. I now give the floor to the representative of Myanmar, Ambassador Hlaing.

Mr. HLAING (Myanmar): Madam President, as I am taking the floor for the first time during this session, I would like to congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency and for the excellent leadership you have provided in presiding over the work of the session. The fact that our work has proceeded so efficiently and smoothly amply demonstrates the diplomatic skill and experience with which you have conducted the meetings. I would also like to congratulate Ambassador Batsanov of the Soviet delegation for the most competent manner in which he guided the work of the Conference during the preceding months, from 18 March to 26 May, including the recess between the first and the second part of the annual session.

I would like to take this opportunity to express my heartfelt thanks for the warm words of welcome addressed to me by my senior colleagues and to reciprocate their kind sentiments with equal pleasure. I look forward to working in close cooperation with all members of the Conference. I wish also to bid farewell to Ambassador Dr. Nabil Elaraby of Egypt, who has been given an important assignment as Permanent Representative of Egypt to the United Nations in New York. My delegation conveys its best wishes to him for further success in his new assignment.

We are holding this session at a time of important and far-reaching positive developments in the international political scene. The end of the cold war has relegated to the background East-West rivalry and has provided a unique opportunity to work out a coherent strategy of peace and security based on dialogue and cooperation. The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), and the new set of confidence-building and security-building measures adopted within the framework of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, are developments which will have a lasting impact on international peace and security. The positive results so far achieved in the bilateral context of negotiations between the two super-Powers have given us hope that much more can be achieved in the field of disarmament. After the crucial breakthrough of the INF Treaty, prospects of significant reductions in strategic nuclear weapons are now within sight. We should, however, not remain complacent. The achievements in the bilateral context in the field of nuclear arms control should be shifted into the multilateral forum. We hope

(Mr. Hlaing, Myanmar)

that the momentum generated by recent positive developments in the world will enable the Conference on Disarmanent, as the single multilateral negotiating body, to produce genuine and viable agreements.

The current session of the CD has been marked by important events such as the United States initiative on chemical weapons. The announcement by President Bush last month that the United States will drop its right of retaliation and destroy all its chemical weapon stocks within 10 years of the convention coming into force constitutes a breakthrough in the negotiations. We hope that this initiative will lead to positive developments. Another notable feature of this session is the increasing participation of non-member States. This trend is indicative of the growing awareness of and interest in the substantive work being done at the Conference.

The greatest danger facing mankind today is the threat of nuclear war. The existence of nuclear weapons and their quantitative and qualitative development jeopardize the vital security interests of all States, both nuclear and non-nuclear. It has come to be generally recognized that a nuclear war cannot be won and must not be fought. The shortest way to remove the danger of a nuclear war is to eliminate all nuclear weapons, and pending the achievement of nuclear disarmament, the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons should be prohibited. The use of nuclear weapons would be contrary to the laws of humanity and would constitute a crime against civilization. It is, therefore, a matter of extreme urgency to achieve nuclear disarmament through complete elimination of all nuclear weapons.

A comprehensive nuclear test ban would be the single most effective measure to bring the nuclear arms race to a halt. A comprehensive test ban would not only promote quantitative reductions but also hamper qualitative improvements of nuclear weapons. Although the amendment conference of the partial test-ban Treaty which was held in New York in January 1991 ended without being able to reach a consensus on the draft declaration, it could not be construed as a failure. Despite the differences in approach to the whole issue, there is overwhelming support on the part of the member States for a significant role played by the Conference on Disarmament in dealing with various aspects of a nuclear test ban.

If we study the agenda of the CD, we will find that the nuclear issues are placed at the top of the agenda, which signifies their importance. The fact that the Conference was able to re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee on agenda item 1, Nuclear test ban, at an early date despite strong views held by some delegations concerning the terms of reference of the Committee, testifies to the importance attached to the question. In this connection, the delegation of Myanmar would like to express its deep appreciation to Ambassador Donowaki of Japan for the very valuable contribution made by him during the formative stages of the work of the Committee during last year and during the inter-sessional period. We are also confident that Ambassador Chadha of India can further improve on the good work done by Ambassador Donowaki.

(Mr. Hlaing, Myanmar)

On agenda item 2, Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, and agenda item 3, Prevention of nuclear war and all related matters, although the Conference has not been able to set up the respective ad hoc committees, a step in the right direction has been made by addressing these subjects in the informal plenary meetings.

The threat of the use of chemical weapons was heightened during the recent Gulf war. The war has once again reminded us of the need for urgent conclusion of a convention completely and totally banning chemical weapons. The Paris Conference on the prohibition of chemical weapons two years ago stressed the necessity of concluding at an early date a convention on chemical weapons and called on the Conference on Disarmanent to redouble its efforts as a matter of urgency to resolve expeditiously the remaining issues and to conclude the convention at the earliest date. It is, therefore, most encouraging to note that considerable progress has been made on various issues which are now reflected in the new "rolling text", though a few key issues still remain to be resolved.

For the effective implementation of the chemical weapons convention universal adherence is of the utmost importance. I fully agree with Ambassador Hyltenius, when in introducing the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons (CD/1046), he stated that the convention must be effective and non-discriminatory in order to be sufficiently attractive and that it must be unattractive to stay outside. It is gratifying to note that increasing numbers of non-members of the Conference on Disarmament are now participating in the negotiations, which augurs well for the prospects of universal adherence to the convention. Regarding the verification system, while substantial progress has been made, important issues still remain.

The future convention must provide for the legitimate concerns of the security of non-possessor States. It is also essential to provide genuine and credible guarantees to States which do not produce or store chemical weapons in a way that will enhance rather than diminish their security. The security of all countries can be best strengthened through the early conclusion and entry into force of the convention. Bringing about an effective, verifiable and truly global convention banning chemical weapons at the earliest date is a political priority.

The Union of Myanmar, which is unequivocally committed to the achievement of the total and comprehensive banning of chemical weapons, possesses no such weapons, nor has the means of producing them, nor the intention of acquiring them. Our country's stand in international forums has always been that of the total banning of all kinds of chemical weapons without exception. We have consistently voted for resolutions which would help ban forever chemical weapons.

I should be remiss if I did not take this opportunity to pay a well-deserved tribute to Ambassador Hyltenius for the valuable contribution he has made through untiring efforts. We are also convinced that under the experienced stewardship of Ambassador Batsanov, further progress can be

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achieved. The Ad Hoc Committee has got off to a good start this year. The recent decision to hold an additional regular session of limited duration during the period 8 to 19 July 1991 would enable the Committee to further intensify its efforts to resolve the remaining issues.

The Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space has been re-established this year with the same mandate as in the past. However, we find it regrettable that it was not possible to improve the mandate of the previous years. Our delegation looks with keen interest upon the initiative of Ambassador García Moritán of Argentina which has enabled the Committee to dwell on the subject in a more practical way.

The early agreement reached to re-establish the ad hoc committees on radiological weapons and negative security assurances gave us a good start to prepare ourselves for constructive work on these items. The early commencement of the work gives us hope that some concrete results can be achieved before the conclusion of the 1991 session.

Concerning item 8, the delegation of Myanmar attaches great importance to the conclusion of a comprehensive programme of disarmament. As consensus has eluded us on the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee, the Conference has in the meanwhile appointed Ambassador Marín Bosch of Mexico as special coordinator responsible for reaching consensus on an appropriate organizational arrangement for that agenda item. Although we place full confidence in the ability of Ambassador Bosch, we hope that the Ad Hoc Committee on item 8 can be re-established as indicated in the General Assembly resolution 45/62 E.

The Conference has been keeping under review the question of improved and effective functioning of the CD every year. This year we are pleased to see the resumption of the informal open-ended consultations under the chairmanship of Ambassador Kamal. On 19 March, Ambassador Kamal made a proposal containing topics for consideration, such as expansion of the CD; the question of groupings; the question of the validity of the agenda; the concept of consensus; the review of the CD's administrative procedures. Many interesting ideas and observations have been put forward at the discussions. Although it may not be easy to find a quick solution to the subject under review, considering the complex nature of the issues, my delegation is confident that under the able guidance of Ambassador Kamal considerable progress can be made.

Madam President, today is the last day of the plenary session under your presidency. The delegation of Myanmar would once again like to thank you for a job well done, especially during this crucial phase of the session. We are confident that the next President, Ambassador Stephen Ledogar of the United States of America, will not only carry onward the good work you have done but also consolidate further the results already achieved.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Myanmar for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to me. I now give the floor to the representative of Mongolia, Ambassador Baljinnyam.

Ms. BALJINNYAM (Mongolia): Madam President, it is indeed an honour and privilege for me to take the floor under your skilful leadership. You are not only one of a few women ambassadors to serve the CD, but also one of those few who has the honour to preside over its proceedings. I am sure that through your commitment and dedication to the cause of disarmament you will also be one of those few to be remembered as the most outstanding lady ambassadors in the world of disarmament. A world dominated by men.

The dawn of the post-cold-war era offers both uncertainty and daunting possibility. The sweeping positive political changes in international relations at times bring forward acute internal problems laden with far-reaching implications. Unresolved problems piled during the past, cry for solutions in the new context in a manner consistent with the spirit of our time. The horizon of world peace that looked so bright and promising last year was darkened by the clouds of war in the Persian Gulf. A lesson to learn from this war is an obvious one. That is the accumulation of weapons of modern conventional types, not speaking of weapons of mass destruction, is fraught with the danger of destabilization and war. The Gulf crisis highlighted the urgent need to stop the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. Problems connected with arms transfer and the destruction of chemical and bacteriological weapons have been put higher on the international political agenda. A number of important initiatives to limit the arms race in the Middle East have been put forward. In this context the relevance and importance of the Conference on Disarmament has become more prominent than ever. Finally, East-West rivalry is being replaced by cooperation. The conclusion of the CFE Treaty heralds the beginning of a new era of inter-State relations in Europe. The example of Europe in reducing tensions and increasing stability is an extremely valuable lesson to other regions and provides important ideas of enhancing a regional approach to disarmament and arms control. My delegation fully shares the view that regional arms control measures constitute central elements of international stability.

During the last couple of years we have been living under the expectations of completing the drafting of a universal, comprehensive and effectively verifiable convention on the total prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons. A task which proved to be rather elusive to achieve. However, in the light of the latest developments, in particular the timely initiative of the United States, a breakthrough in the negotiations has become a reality.

My delegation welcomes the United States initiatives, its readiness to forswear the use of chemical weapons and its commitment to destroy its chemical weapon stocks. The new constructive United States stand opens the way to solve two of the most central issues of the future convention. Mongolia fully supports the call made by President Bush to resolve major outstanding issues by the end of 1991 and complete the convention within the next 12 months. We are in favour of intensifying the negotiations and support the proposal for a package solution taking into account the interests of States participating in the negotiations, initiated by the Chairman of the

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Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, Ambassador Serguei Batsanov. We see the advantage of this approach in the fact that it provides the opportunity to examine the important problems connected with security, verification and organization in their close interrelationship.

There are a number of complex issues the settlement of which will require not only technical solutions but political decisions. I have in mind the questions of verification, decision-making and financial obligations of States parties, as well as economic cooperation and development. My delegation fully shares the view that the negotiations on banning chemical weapons are at a critical stage, and in need of strong political support from every quarter. At the same time we consider that with the necessary flexibility and willingness of all parties to compromise, progress towards finalization of the convention should be within reach. In this context Mongolia supports the convening of a well-prepared ministerial meeting, which would not only give a strong impetus to the negotiations but solve the last remaining issues. For the sake of the universality of the future convention on chemical weapons such a meeting could be open for participation to all interested States.

My delegation sees in the successful conclusion of the consultations on the new mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons the reaffirmation of the commitment of the CD members to conclude the convention as swiftly as possible. Given the consensus of all regional groups to ensure consistency during the final stages of the negotiations my delegation is ready to support Peru's idea of keeping the same bureau under Ambassador Batsanov's chairmanship.

Mongolia has consistently advocated the achievement of a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing, considering that this would constitute a reliable guarantee to halt the horizontal and vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons. My Government welcomes the decision of France to join the NPT and hopes that similar action by other nuclear and militarily important States will make a valuable contribution to the strengthening of the non-proliferation regime and indeed international security as a whole. It is our firm belief that the end of the cold war and the emerging new pattern of international relations based on confidence and cooperation make the old arguments for the continuation of nuclear tests obsolete and unconvincing. We fully agree that a CTB will need a highly effective and reliable verification system and a lot of complex technical work is needed to elaborate such a system. The Conference on Disarmanent and its Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban will play an essential and indispensable role in this endeavour.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Mongolia for her statement and also for her kind words addressed to me. I now give the floor to the representative of Argentina, Ambassador García Moritán.

Mr. GARCIA MORITAN (Argentina) (translated from Spanish): Recently I have had occasion to hold consultations with you in your capacity as representative of the United Kingdom on items of special common interest, Madam President, and I have found in you a disposition which I value highly

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and which in my view reflects diplomatic qualities from which the Conference on Disarmament has benefited greatly during your presidency. You may be assured of the respect of my delegation.

The negotiations on the chemical weapons convention have finally acquired the pace and the prospect of an early conclusion. It is particularly encouraging to see how a flexible and constructive approach has given a fresh impulse to a negotiating process whose lack of progress was at odds with a definitely positive international climate. Hence we welcome the fact that this determination has finally reached our negotiating table. It is unnecessary to reiterate our commitment and our fullest possible political will to finalize the instrument as soon as possible, so that 1992 is definitely the year in which the Conference on Disarmament will be able to submit to the United Nations General Assembly its first multilateral disarmament agreement. Time is short, but if a positive consequence may be drawn from our protracted deliberations for almost a decade, it is that we all know perfectly well which are the concrete areas where we will have to concentrate our greatest efforts in this final phase in order to achieve a balanced and effective text.

My country does not possess and has never possessed or used chemical weapons. Like many others participating in these negotiations, our interest has always been focused on achieving a coherent agreement from the viewpoint of national security, but at the same time above all one that guarantees that enthusiasm in tackling the military aspects of science and the chemical industry will not hamper the unrestricted development of this sector in its real, i.e. civil dimension. That is why, in embarking on this stage of the negotiations we focus special attention, inter alia, on two very specific aspects thereof - firstly, the economic and commercial consequences of the convention, and secondly the characteristics of the verification system which will ultimately be agreed.

In respect of the first question, I think that in this field it should be possible for us as negotiators to find points of convergence. No one, I feel - in particular those among us who will have to justify decisions taken here before our parliaments - favours an agreement that imposes undue controls or restrictions upon the chemical industry. My country, whose chemical industry is a significant contributor to the gross national product, is among those that consider this sector to display one of the highest levels of dynamism and growth potential in the economy. It is logical to conclude that it is in our interests to facilitate the conclusion of an agreement that will not be perceived by our chemical industry as an obstacle to its activities, which, as in most countries active in this area, are already subject to detailed health and environmental regulations. In this context, it seems important to stress that in order to be a balanced and fair instrument, the convention on chemical weapons that we are about to conclude will have to be economically and commercially neutral - in other words its provisions should not result in competitive imbalances or industrial or commercial advantages to the benefit or detriment of any of its States parties. This is something that we will have to bear especially in mind in the context of the institutional machinery to be set up under article VIII of the convention.

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At the same time, we must strive to make sure that once the convention has been concluded, it constitutes the sole operational standard in force regarding controls over exports and transfers of chemicals and equipment related to the chemical industry. Once the treaty enters into force nothing should prevent extensive cooperation and exchange of chemicals for purposes not prohibited by the treaty. Once the convention enters into force, each State party should, in conformity with its provisions, ensure through national legislation the proper fulfilment of the provisions of the treaty to which it has just acceded. The continued existence of additional controls would result in a dual legal regime applicable to chemical activities which would undoubtedly overlap with the convention, thus in our view creating the dangerous situation of parallel legal frameworks, leading to ambiguous situations and penalizing the private sector. The existence of parallel or restricted groups, whose purpose has hitherto been to limit the transfer of certain chemicals in the absence of a binding multilateral rule, would no longer make any sense. Unless, as we pointed out, the same States that drafted the treaty felt so dissatisfied with the result of our efforts that they did not hesitate to send a signal which was both politically transparent and negative from the viewpoint of confidence-building, acknowledging that the convention so painstakingly elaborated is inadequate to eliminate the menace of chemical weapons in a credible manner. The proposed conference at the ministerial level that has been suggested as a political alternative to provide a final political boost to our negotiations might perhaps offer a good occasion for those countries that have so far relied on this type of unilateral measure to announce that, as from the entry into force of the convention, they will recognize the due primacy of this instrument and cease to apply controls of this type to the States parties.

Closely connected with this problem is that of the protection of information of scientific or commercial value. The question has been the subject of consideration in the "rolling text", and will undoubtedly deserve more attention from the technical secretariat, which in discharging its responsibilities will necessarily have access to a wealth of information on production volumes as well as the present planned activities of a good part of the world's chemical industry. I think it is useful for us to bear in mind in thinking about this problem that the future organization to be established will have to devote itself to ensuring the application of the provisions of the convention, facilitating activities relating to verification of compliance and providing a forum for consultation and cooperation among States parties. Verification activities will require great zeal on the part of the technical secretariat, which will be in possession of data which are intrinsically of incontestable scientific and commercial value.

The chapter of this convention on verification will, as we all know, have two main components. The first, in accordance with the provisions of article IX, will, through challenge inspections, deal with individual situations that may be considered potentially harmful for the convention as they point to possible violations of the provisions of the very heart of the agreement - relating to the possible production of chemical weapons in open breach of the spirit and the letter of the agreement. Consequently, in our view, our efforts should be aimed at creating a system as complete and

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reassuring as possible. My delegation will revert to the important problem of inspections on request in the near future, however, today we should like to share with the delegations some ideas on verification of activities not prohibited by the convention, under article VI of the instrument. This component of verification refers to activities not prohibited by the convention, and for that very reason it is different in implications and scope from those related to inspections on request. Here, verification measures are designed to preserve the instrument through systematic periodic monitoring of certain facilities which are regarded as being of importance and are engaged in perfectly legitimate activities. It will come as no surprise that for a country like mine, which does not possess and has never possessed chemical weapons, this is the area of verification that attracts the greatest attention, since this is the machinery which will apply to a sizeable extent to civil industry.

From the resumption of our negotiations at the beginning of this year, the debate took on a new dimension in the wake of the introduction of concepts such as the "integrated approach" proposed by the delegation of Sweden. We understand that this turn in the debate, regardless of the final shape of the verification system, is a positive factor in itself, in so far as it can be said to have alerted us all to the direction our deliberations were taking. It became increasingly evident that the verification arrangements as they appeared in the "rolling text", in addition to being tremendously costly, would not necessarily be appropriate for the objective they were supposed to pursue. A simple statistical survey of facilities throughout the world which would be subject to inspections revealed the practical limitations of the system. From the moment when we negotiators accepted this premise and took on the task of refocusing our efforts on the search for a more appropriate and manageable system, we have seen with some disappointment that, as if obeying the logic of an irresistible attraction, the discussions appear to be giving way once again to the reiteration of ideas, that take us back to schemes for the delimitation of "capable" chemical industry of such theoretical breadth that we might well wonder what the point of the simplification exercise is if ultimately - this time with different arguments - we will arrive at verification schemes which are unnecessarily ambitious.

In the view of my delegation, a possible means of proceeding could be based on the integrated approach, duly moderated and modified through the inclusion of other definition criteria, for example, the selection of major chemical industry categories, in order to avoid from the outset the possibility of affecting the normal operation of industries and sectors that are unlikely to embark on the production or processing of certain chemicals included, for instance, in schedule 2. In this respect, it might be necessary to work towards a definition of industrial categories on the basis of specific criteria and not necessarily using existing rules which, while they may serve as a useful basis for the final definition, have been conceived on purely commercial grounds and thus do not necessarily reflect the political perspective relating to security that might be developed here. The delimitation can also benefit from the definition of certain chemical processes, as proposed in the integrated approach, although here we should perhaps move forward on greater precision and greater detail so as to avoid,

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here too, an excessively broad framework which would once again produce arrangements that were unworkable in practice. The general criterion, which in our view should offer basic orientation, provides that verification of such a huge and complex sector as the chemical industry should be kept within reasonable limits - all the more so if we recognize that even a system providing for thousands of inspections per year would not be sufficient to guarantee that the convention was not being breached in one way or another in a dozen small facilities located in different points of the globe.

Let me refer to an issue that has a close relationship with the preceding reflections on verification under article VI, and one which in my delegation's view deserves particular attention. One of the effects of the new debate on the type of verification applicable to the chemical industry has been to focus our efforts on the work being done under the guidance of France as a Friend of the Chair for technical matters to delimit what is normally called "capable" chemical industry. My delegation would like us in this important exercise to try to stop referring to "capable" chemical industry - for a number of reasons. An inexperienced observer following our negotiations, on observing our attempts to define "capable" chemical industry, might well wonder what capability we are speaking of. For those of us who are participating in this exercise, the specialists and those who, overcoming boredom, are following our efforts, there is no doubt that we are referring to chemical industry which has the capability to produce chemicals that because of their toxicity and incapacitating nature are deemed subject to inclusion in schedules 1 and 2, but which are not at present engaged in producing, consuming or processing them. No one can ignore the fact that the idea, the concept of capabilities or capability in the context of security and disarmament matters has had a very clear meaning, as it brings to mind precisely the capability for aggressive applications, often on the margins of, or behind the back of, the international community. I think that in a field like that of the chemical industry, where what we are trying to do in seeking an integrated approach is to delimit facilities which are important in terms of the application of this convention, but nevertheless do not constitute a danger for its purposes and objectives, we should avoid a semantic formula that conveys an idea contrary to the objectives underlying it.

Just over a year ago, when the international climate allowed us to turn down the volume of our polemic on inspections under article IX, it was considered appropriate to stop referring to challenge inspections. The concepts of inspection on demand or on request modified the terminology in view of the fact that the very point at stake was the correct designation of what will be one of the key provisions of the convention. In this connection we believe a fortiori that when speaking of the civil chemical industry it would be advisable to drop the term "capable" and replace it by a more appropriate expression. I am convinced that behind the appearance of a semantic question in this matter lies an entire attitude and a disposition, an animus, in the Latin tradition, which should be guided by an attitude of respect and self-restraint vis-à-vis the world's chemical industry, without whose cooperation the best machinery we could devise will be a dead letter.

(Mr. García Moritán, Argentina)

It has been said that the illusion of security is worse than the absence of security. A verification system more concerned about monitoring civil activities than about setting up a solid and comprehensive system of challenge inspections may in our view lead to an unhappy combination of high costs and an illusion of security.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Argentina for his statement and for his kind words. That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other member wish to take the floor? It seems not.

I would like now to turn to document CD/WP.407, containing a draft decision on the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, and to take it up for action. If there is no objection I shall take it that the Conference is ready to adopt the draft decision.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: I give the floor to the representative of Peru.

Mr. CALDERON (Peru) (translated from Spanish): First of all, Madam President, I should like to convey to you my delegation's great pleasure at the way in which you have conducted our work in these past four weeks. The results we have obtained are proof of your outstanding abilities and we are very gratified at that.

As regards document CD/WP.407, I should simply like to point out that the expression "antes de 1992 [before 1992]" in the eighth line of the Spanish translation should be replaced by "en 1992 [by 1992]".

The PRESIDENT: The secretariat will put that right.

May I now turn to two organizational matters? The first deals with the activities of the Ad Hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear-weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons. The Chairman of the Committee has expressed the wish, which I understand is shared by some other delegations, to hold a meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee before the end of the second part of the annual session. After a careful review of the situation, which shows a very busy week facing us before we suspend the work of the plenary on 27 June, the only available date is tomorrow, Friday 21 June, in the afternoon. Accordingly, the Ad Hoc Committee will meet at 3 p.m. tomorrow.

The second question refers to our activities during the coming days. The secretariat has circulated today the usual timetable of meetings to be held by the Conference and by its subsidiary bodies. As you will see, the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons will hold a series of meetings with representatives from industry. The timetable is merely indicative and may be changed, if necessary. On this understanding, I suggest that the Conference adopt it.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: As announced at the opening of this plenary meeting, the Conference will hold an informal meeting on the substance of agenda item 3 which will take place in approximately 10 minutes after the end of this plenary meeting, and we will have the participation of the representatives of the Soviet Union and the United States to the nuclear and space talks.

I should like now to make my closing statement at the end of the presidency of the United Kingdom of Great Britian and Northern Ireland.

Four weeks have passed and my tenure as President of this Conference is virtually at an end. I said four weeks ago that, thanks to the efficiency of my predecessors, the structure of the Conference work was already well in place. In other words the Conference was on auto-control and all this pilot would need to do was a slight adjustment here and there. It has indeed proved to be the case.

During the last four weeks this Conference has been honoured by visits of a number of eminent government ministers and officials. On 6 June the Conference heard statements by the Hon. Douglas Hogg QC MP, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom, by State Secretary Helga Hernes of Norway and by Dr. Taro Nakayama, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan; and on 13 June by the Hon. Douglas Graham, Minister for Disarmament and Arms Control of New Zealand. These visits have been a reminder of the high expectations our Governments have of the work of the Conference.

Another indication of the importance attached to this Conference by the international community is the fact that two further States, Angola and Ireland, have applied and been accepted as non-member States participating in the work of the Conference. I am sure they will make a most useful contribution to our deliberations.

As part of the negotiations for a chemical weapons convention, three decisions have been taken by the Conference. A letter to non-member States not participating in the Conference was approved for transmission by myself as President and Ambassador Batsanov as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. That letter is being transmitted today. The Conference endorsed a recommendation by the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons that inter-sessional work should continue from 8 to 19 July, and we have just agreed important additions to the Ad Hoc Committee's mandate.

I confess I had hoped that decisions would be reached under my presidency on the timetable for additional inter-sessional work during the rest of the year. It has as you know, proved possible to reach an informal understanding (not yet discussed and endorsed formally by the Conference) on inter-sessional work from 30 September to 11 October and 18 November to 20 December as well as from 6 to 18 January. Unfortunately it has not yet been possible to reach agreement concerning the three weeks during the biological weapons Convention review conference and the five weeks during the United Nations General Assembly First Committee. This is a matter which will have to be returned to later. There are a number of considerations which have to be taken into account, and it is certainly not for the President to take sides in

(The President)

the debate. But I would like to make one point. We have just about reached halfway in the time so far made available for chemical weapons negotiations during 1991. Think how much has been achieved during the first half, and then compare it with how much still remains to be settled before we can achieve our common goal of an early convention. It is a sobering thought. We surely should not dismiss lightly the possibility of according yet more of the available time to our chemical weapons negotiations.

I have no progress to report on my consultations on proposals for expanding the membership of the Conference. I understand that Ambassador Marín Bosch of Mexico has nothing new to report on his consultations on the comprehensive programme of disarmament. Ambassador Kamal of Pakistan held a further open-ended consultation on improved and effective functioning on 18 June. A welcome development in the conduct of our business is, as I announced a little while ago, participation in the informal plenary this morning of the USSR and United States of America representatives to the nuclear and space talks to brief us on developments in their negotiations.

In this my final plenary as President, I should like to thank you all for your kindness and support. A special thanks to the members of my bureau. My gratitude goes to the Secretary-General and Deputy Secretary-General of the Conference and to their excellent secretariat. They ease the task of a President enormously.

I know my successor, Ambassador Ledogar of the United States, will enjoy the same support. His excellent qualities need no introduction from me. I wish him luck.

That concludes my statement. I have no other business for this plenary meeting and I shall now proceed to adjourn it. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 25 June, at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 11.20 a.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.597
25 June 1991

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE FIVE HUNDRED AND NINETY-SEVENTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 25 June 1991, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Stephen J. Ledogar (United States of America)

GE.91-61467/3310B

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 597th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

At the beginning of the presidency of the United States of America, I should like to make a brief opening statement.

Though my accession to this office is due only to accidents of timing and alphabet, it is nevertheless a high honour for me, as head of the United States delegation, to assume the presidency of this Conference. I am well aware of the importance of the job, and of its difficulties. I shall spare neither time nor effort in carrying out the tasks of this office, and I'll do my level best to keep these efforts clearly separate from my national responsibilities.

Before proceeding further, I take this opportunity to pay tribute to all of the distinguished persons who have served as President before me this year. Each has provided diligent and effective direction to the work of this body. As thee place of the United Kingdom delegation again starts its six-year circuit around this quadrangle, I would like especially to offer the congratulations and thanks of my delegation to my colleague, Ambassador Solesby of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, for her outstanding work as President of the Conference during the past four weeks. We have all appreciated the intelligent and impartial manner in which she discharged her duties, as well as her strenuous efforts to advance our work - efforts which she has modestly characterized as minor adjustments to the auto-pilot controls. For all of her achievements we are profoundly grateful.

It has been pointed out to me that I come to this job at an easy time in the cycle. The committees of the Conference are in place and operating as smoothly as possible. Informal discussions on agenda items 2 and 3 are also being held on a regular basis, and yet report-writing doesn't begin until after I turn over the gavel to Ambassador Arteaga on 11 August. But, perhaps a few things can be accomplished while I'm here. On the subject of expansion of membership, I have asked Ambassador Kamal of Pakistan, and he has kindly agreed, to work with me in conducting private consultations with individual members and groups within the framework of the CD President's consultations, where all are represented. We will place special emphasis on trying to find a formula for expansion within the structural framework identified for us by previous CD Presidents this year.

I'm not partial to long introductory statements by new CD Presidents. I will allow myself just a few personal words on this occasion. The Conference on Disarmament is comprised of a group of States from all over the world whose representatives come together to consider issues and to negotiate agreements. It is the only negotiating forum where, on the basis of equality in voice, such a group of States, regardless of their military potential, their economic prowess, or their geographical size meet to come to grips with urgent security problems of our times. Each and every State can make a significant contribution to the efforts to achieve arms control and disarmament. We seek to serve the objectives of international peace and security. We do so in a world which, thankfully, has been spared the agony of a global conflict for nearly a half-century. Yet out world has, sadly enough, witnessed a

(The President)

continuation of suffering, destruction and death in numerous violent regional and internal conflicts during this period. It is a matter of great importance, therefore, that this Conference address the urgent issues on its agenda. As numerous speakers before me have already recalled, of utmost urgency is a total ban on chemical weapons.

As you know, at the beginning of this session the United States set forth some new elements in the approach it wishes to take in pursuit of a chemical weapons ban. In the process we reversed two major, long-held United States positions which most of you had identified as obstacles to progress. We didn't bargain for their removal; President Bush swept them away unconditionally. His purpose was to strengthen the prospects for a successful and speedy conclusion of a chemical weapons convention. In the weeks that followed I've sensed a new spirit of optimism and challenge in this body. We do have a very large task ahead of us, but with the will to succeed we will succeed. The chemical weapons convention will be concluded in 1992 and we will proceed to destroy these terrible weapons which threaten all mankind.

I believe we can help make our world a better place. Let us, then, continue our work in a new spirit, with a willingness to listen to, and to learn from, each other, and with a commitment to nothing less than success.

Finally, I would like to express my greetings to the Secretary-General of the Conference and Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Ambassador Miljan Komatina, to Ambassador Vicente Berasategui, the Deputy Secretary-General of the Conference, and to members of the President's bureau. And I thank them in advance for the invaluable assistance I know we will receive from them.

That concludes my statement. I have on my list of speakers today the representatives of Spain and Canada. I would now like to give the floor to the representative of Spain, Ambassador Pérez-Villanueva.

Mr. PEREZ-VILLANUEVA (Spain) (translated from Spanish): It is a real honour and a pleasure for me to meet Ambassador Ledogar once again as President of this Conference after having had an opportunity personally to witness his professional skill and negotiating ability in Vienna some time ago when he and I participated in the conventional disarmament talks that were then just beginning and would later, as you all know, become crystallized in the agreement on conventional forces in Europe. Allow me therefore, as I begin my statement, to congratulate you and offer you my delegation's best wishes at the beginning of your term in the very important post it falls to you to occupy at a particularly interesting and intensely active time in the life of the Conference on Disarmament. I am sure that during your term as President, benefiting from your drive and guidance, pursuing the path taken by your immediate and illustrious predecessors, Ambassador Solesby and Ambassador Batsanov, this forum will make definite progress on the many outstanding questions in each of the committees, and especially the committee dealing with chemical weapons. I followed with great attention your very interesting statements on the inauguration of your presidency, and I think

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that your remarks on beginning your term are highly appropriate for tackling the problem of expanding the membership of the Conference. I will refer to them later. Thank you, therefore, to you and Ambassador Kamal.

We were talking about a particularly interesting period in the Conference on Disarmament and in the international context in which we are operating. There are events, and changes, taking place in the international scene today that for most part give us hope and in any event are of great interest. On 29 May of this year, the President of the United States announced a series of proposals for controlling the spread of nuclear, bacteriological and chemical weapons in the Middle East, proposals that you yourself, Mr. President, presented in this room. The initiative seeks to curb the proliferation of missiles and the destabilizing conventional arms race in that region of the world. Spain welcomes this United States initiative, through which an attempt might be made to bring military arsenals into line with the real defensive requirements of States in a particularly sensitive region. More recently, the President of France also proposed a global arms control plan while announcing his country's decision of principle to accede to the NPT. Spain applauds this decision, which will most certainly help to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime and will undoubtedly set an example for other countries that have yet to join. The measures proposed by France and presented to this Conference recently by Ambassador Errera are very much in line with the Spanish position, especially in so far as their underlying philosophy is concerned (the need to promote regional and global stability through arms control and non-proliferation) as well as the instruments it suggests (universalization of the NPT and the MTCR, speeding up of the CW negotiations in Geneva, etc.). Spain believes, Mr. President, that your country's initiative as well as that of France are particularly timely as the Gulf crisis has dramatically highlighted the consequences of excessive arms accumulation in an especially unstable region. Specifically with regard to the expectations surrounding the Conference on Disarmament, we welcome with special satisfaction the initiative you recently presented on behalf of President Bush substantially modifying the United States position on certain outstanding obstacles in the chemical weapons Committee. This change in your country's negotiating position is most gratifying and will undoubtedly give a substantial stimulus to the negotiating process towards a convention.

The situation in the Conference on Disarmament in the short and medium term gives urgency to the task of reflecting on its immediate future - a task that has already been tackled by some delegations in this plenary, and one in which my delegation would now like to join, thus playing a part in harnessing the momentum given to this forum by the expected conclusion within the next 12 months of a convention eliminating an entire category of weapons. That success, which will certainly be achieved, should pave the way towards a greater and better use of the resources of this Conference and the institution in itself as the international community's sole forum for disarmament negotiations.

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We are not lacking in subjects that could be used to update our agenda, and specifically it might be useful for this assembly to benefit from the experience that some of the countries participating in it as full members or simple observers have acquired in, for example, security-building and confidence-building measures, or regional disarmament. In spite of recent fierce war crises, the future gives grounds for hope, and we think that the necessary conditions exist for the international community to take the right path towards better coexistence and the replacement of confrontation by cooperation. In this favourable climate I am certain that together we will be able to forge a future using our Conference on Disarmament in a way that will enable everyone to benefit fully. Mr. President, you may count on the support and cooperation of my delegation at all times and as far as we are able.

For several years now the participating countries, be they full members or observers in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, have been staging trials applying the rules that the chemical weapons convention will soon lay down for the different types of inspection it is likely to establish. The carrying out of trial inspections has become a praiseworthy and particularly intensive tradition in the last few years. These national trial inspections have several aims, generally seeking to check the feasibility of the inspection provisions in the draft text of the convention, and at the same time to determine the degree of preparedness and awareness of governments as well as private chemical industry and the armed forces with regard to the forthcoming application of the convention on the total prohibition of the production, development, use and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction.

Spain, wishing, in keeping with government policy in this area, to contribute actively to the attainment of an effective and verifiable convention, has carried out a national trial inspection, in the form of a routine inspection, the results of which appear in the report that I am pleased to present today to this Conference (CD/1082). The carrying out of the national trial inspection had a dual purpose: the immediate purpose of making a direct contribution on the part of my country to the negotiations being held in Geneva, and indirectly but no less importantly, to set in motion a mechanism for raising awareness in the public and private sector in Spain about the implications for either side that will undoubtedly stem from the entry into force of the convention.

Systematic contacts were held among the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Federation of Spanish Chemical Industries and some companies of special importance in the Spanish chemical industry before the trial inspection was carried out. The task in the first stage was to up-date information on the Spanish chemical sector and at the same time lay the foundations of what will shortly become the national authority under the convention. These initial contacts proved very useful, firstly in identifying the general features of the company to be chosen for the trial inspections, and secondly in establishing smoother relations between the authorities and the private sector in this field. In subsequent meetings the specific programme of activities was prepared and tasks were allotted to all the agencies and experts directly or indirectly involved in the operation.

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My country obtained important information as a direct result of the inspection, particularly with regard to its limits and the benefits of the inspection system. First of all, on-site inspection is an essential element for verification of a chemical weapons convention. Moreover, in this instance inspection is feasible, for as our experience has shown, it is possible to find a way to respect the company's confidentiality concerns without diminishing the effectiveness of the inspectors' task. Cooperation between the company and the inspection team is also extremely important. And lastly, it is very useful to schedule the "field" inspection in the industrial plant itself simultaneously with the inspection of the administrative and commercial machinery, which, as has been shown by experience in many other countries, in addition to Spanish experience, will be longer and more complex than the former, in most cases. Through this exercise Spain reaffirmed its belief that inspection in its different forms, as a right and as a duty, is the only element which can fully guarantee the security of the countries that are parties to the future convention. In this instance, Spain tested the system established for routine inspection of a large industrial chemical plant. My Government also plans to stage a trial inspection on request, if time allows, jointly with another country participating in this Conference. And this is my Government's intention because, considering the experience acquired through the trial routine inspection, the importance of including inspection on request or challenge inspection in our future convention with no restrictions other than purely technical ones has become even more evident. An inspection of this kind, for which there is no substitute in terms of political value, should be accepted without preconceived restrictions, conditions or limitations on the understanding that it is possible to strike a balance between the company's legitimate concerns, the unrenounceable right to secrecy in defence matters and the aim of the inspection itself, whose benefits are well worth a major effort.

I am pleased to be able to announce to you today that, as regards chemical weapons, and more specifically the 1925 Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphixiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, my Government is undertaking a detailed study on the possibility of the early withdrawal of the reservations made by my country to the text of the Protocol, to which it acceded in the summer of 1929. Spain would thus renounce the use of chemical weapons erga omnes and therefore also the right of reprisals in kind. I hope to make an official statement on this matter very soon.

On 3 April 1990 the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs in his first statement to this Conference on Disarmament in its entire history, referred, inter alia, to an aspect that is of particular concern to Spain, all the more so at this time when security arrangements in the world are changing and are being restructured. I am referring to the expansion of the membership of the Conference, on which Mr. Fernández Ordóñez said that there was no doubt that in the current international situation, the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva had acquired essential importance and responsibility as the sole multilateral disarmament negotiating organ in the United Nations system. In that context, he fully supported the efforts of the Conference and for that reason, and since Spain had been actively participating for years as an observer, he

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trusted that Spain would be able to become a full member as soon as possible so that it could contribute to its work more and in a more effective way. In the preceding years, the process of expansion of the number of full members of the Conference had been blocked. That had prevented the entry of countries which, like Spain, had on numerous occasions shown, as they continued to show day by day, their interest in contributing constructively and effectively to the disarmament process.

As far back as 1979 the principle that the Conference should periodically review its membership was adopted, following which the decision was taken in 1982 to actually expand the Conference in a limited fashion. The system for allocating the four seats that were approved in 1983 for expanding the membership of the Conference was established in 1986, and from then up to the present, partly because of difficulties encountered in the nomination of candidates, and partly for political reasons that are perhaps less clear, the Conference has not only retained its numerus clausus but has even lost one of its members, though admittedly for very unusual reasons. This sequence of events is well known and in recent months has frequently been referred to in this very room as the expression of growing concern over a situation that has already lasted too long.

Allow me to make a few remarks on this subject. The assumptions on the basis of which the Conference on Disarmament was established, including its different forms and titles, have radically changed. This organ is no longer called upon to promote, in an almost exclusively bilateral manner, disarmament agreements between two militarily and ideologically irreconcilable blocs with the help of a group of States not officially belonging to either of those two groups. In 1978 it was laid down in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly that what was then known as the Committee on Disarmament was to become a multilateral negotiating body, and this is the universally acknowledged status of the Conference on Disarmament, its successor since 1984. Paragraph 28 of that same document lays down that all States have the duty to contribute to and the right to participate in disarmament efforts, and, as a logical consequence, paragraph 120 enshrines the principle of regular increases in the membership of the Committee. Hence even at that time the organ of which our Conference is a direct descendant came into being with aspirations to universality, which for the moment are being frustrated by the passage of time, with no solutions being found to the expansion problem. If the situation is no longer what it was then, when the purposes and rules of procedure for this negotiating organ were established at its inception, and if the plans for expansion set forth by the General Assembly at that time have not been carried out, we must conclude that the Conference on Disarmament's mode of representation today is neither the most appropriate nor does it accurately correspond to a political scene that differs substantially from that which prevailed at the end of the 1970s. In a word, we think that all those that are here should be here, but that not all that should be here in the Conference on Disarmament are here.

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In these circumstances, and in a well-intentioned effort to overcome the difficulties caused by the deadlock on the expansion of the Conference on Disarmament for so long for those States that aspire to become full members, we have applied for all these years the formula already set out in articles 32 to 36 in section IX of the Committee's rules of procedure and in paragraphs 120 (g) and (h) of the Final Document itself. I am referring of course to participation in the negotiations by non-member States at their request. In our judgement this formula is a palliative which, though obviously useful for observer States - and Spain has been making use of it all this time thanks to the generosity of the member States - clearly is not a complete substitute for full membership status. Naturally it is very useful because it allows for inputs of points of view, experience and suggestions, as well as all kinds of observations, from outside the Conference, so to speak, on the subjects under discussion within it. But the formula is inadequate because two important factors operate in the way the Conference on Disarmament works: views relating to the actual security of States, a subject that the work in the Committee relates to almost exclusively, and the rule of decision-making by consensus, which derives from the sovereign equality of the participants. Thus, the Conference on Disarmament deals with subjects that are particularly deeply rooted in the concept of national sovereignty, on which any deal reached is complex and must be reflected upon and weighed carefully, in full knowledge of the responsibility being assumed. It is therefore only natural that decisions should be taken by consensus, implying the right of veto, which is the very right that observers lack. And in my opinion this is the feature that defines observer status. This aside, there is very little difference in the modus operandi of observers and members in everyday practice, thanks to the generous disposition of the member countries of the Conference on Disarmament. But fundamentally, because of this lack of a right of veto, because of this different and important legal status of the observer, his contributions to the Conference can only be considered secondary, strictly speaking, since it will be up to the full members to decide whether or not they will be taken into account. Thus, given that the observer cannot assert his views during the negotiations, at the time of acceding to the result of those negotiations, his national concerns, his own views, which are legitimate and worthy of respect, can only be expressed in the form of reservations to the text being signed, which - still purely within a theoretical framework - has negative repercussions for the country in question and for the entire international community. This state of affairs ultimately leads to the conclusion, in our view, that the status of what is known as an observer country is not sufficient, especially bearing in mind that the aim of negotiations is as important as ours is here and now, in this Conference and in the present historical circumstances.

The need to ensure effectiveness in the negotiations by keeping the number of full members limited is sometimes advanced as an argument in favour of maintaining the status quo and the present membership of the Conference on Disarmament at least for the time being. A conference open to everyone, giving full access to all the elements of the international community, would soon become a forum for theoretical rather than practical debate, in which the almost infinite diversity of views would cripple the consensus on concrete documents dealing with specific topics - this has often been said. In our

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opinion, the equation deliberative forum = large assembly, negotiating forum = body with limited membership is not automatically true. In fact, we think that the argument in favour of effectiveness in the negotiations through limited participation, which is generally valid, in this instance comes up against two nuances, one theoretical, the other practical. The former has to do with the reality, which I have already mentioned, of the necessary and confirmed universal character of the Conference on Disarmament. The latter has to do with a simple observation that for the moment not all the member countries of the United Nations have applied for membership in the Conference on Disarmament, even as participating non-members (though there is one well-known applicant that is still not a Member of the United Nations). The figures are truly significant. Perhaps, therefore, the difficulty the expansion would pose might not really be so great in diminishing the negotiating efficiency of an assembly that already has 39 members.

In his statement to this assembly last year, the Foreign Minister also said he was convinced that a step towards the expansion of the Conference would give a vital boost to the disarmament negotiations and help to ensure universal endorsement of any disarmament agreements that might be adopted within the Conference, that being a problem which would sooner or later have to be faced by a Conference on Disarmament restricted, as currently, to a limited number of members. As can be inferred from these words, the longed-for universal accession to these legal instruments that are taking shape in this field is a thought-provoking subject in relation to the membership of the Conference and access to it. According to all indications, and as evidenced by the wishes expressed by many delegations in this very plenary and by the progress in the negotiations, we are on the verge of reaping the fruit of a long and difficult task in concluding a chemical weapons convention, thus taking a truly historic step in the recent arms control and disarmament processes.

One of the basic components of a convention of this kind is of course accession by the widest possible number of parties, which will satisfactorily guarantee the security of all and compensate for the sacrifices made by the signatories. Therefore, it seems somewhat contradictory to wish for the widest accession to the chemical weapons convention, as is indeed logical, while at the same time limiting access to the forum in which it is negotiated. Spain has repeatedly declared its firm resolve to sign the chemical weapons convention as soon as it is open for signature, but on the other hand somewhat regrets that this is the only course fully consistent with its status as a sovereign country that my country can follow in the immediate foreseeable future since, as has been stated, its participation in the negotiating process is limited. The fact that Spain is not yet a member of the Conference on Disarmament, despite its reiterated interest over the years, does not alter the basic political decision on the chemical weapons convention or any other that may be negotiated in this field and is in keeping with Spain's security interests and those of its friends and allies. There remains, however, the possibility that this contradiction to which we referred earlier may become a deep rift in the normative system which the Conference on Disarmament intends to present to the international community, and this rift, which will never be

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exploited by Spain, will certainly be exploited by those that are already looking for its weaknesses and the means to evade the objectives of a future chemical weapons convention.

It goes without saying that if the Conference's aim is to negotiate legal instruments for the international community, neither will benefit in any way from restricted access to the institution for some members of that community, and even less so for an apparently indefinite period of time. Spain is a country, though of course not the only one, whose continued presence in the ranks of mere observers in this room and in this Conference cannot but cause a certain surprise. As a part, and a very active and staunch part, in a solid framework, of all kinds of mutual interests with like-minded countries in its geographical region and outside it, on the basis of government institutions irrevocably rooted in the democratic beliefs of an entire people, my country ought to become a full member of the Conference on Disarmament within a reasonable period of time. Spain is not a great Power either as far as defence is concerned or in industrial or economic terms. It is, however, a great European country whose position links it especially through history and geographical proximity to Africa and the Arab world in particular and through its historical and deep cultural relationship to the Americas. Hence, it does not seem easy to explain to public opinion in such a country that its political, social, economic and historical profile today is not sufficient to earn it a place among the countries that play a leading role in the United Nations' sole negotiating forum in the field of disarmament.

My delegation is aware of the difficulties that have crippled decision-making on the Conference's expansion over the years. It is also aware that the situation of profound changes and modifications in the world today, and particularly the changes in the traditional grouping of countries in terms of political affinities, constitutes indirectly an additional difficulty for my country's membership of this Conference. For that reason I would like to make a cordial and hopeful appeal to the 39 present members of this Conference to find a formula soon which can meet Spain's aspirations. In that regard, as I said at the beginning of my statement, your opening remarks, Sir, are particularly welcome.

I would also like to remind the Conference that on 1 July 1978, through the different countries' permanent missions to the United Nations in New York, my country presented its candidature for the then Committee on Disarmament. This candidature was officially restated during the general debate in the Assembly on 23 July 1982, in relation to the future Conference on Disarmament. Much more recently Spain's wish was repeated formally and explicitly by the Minister of Foreign Affairs in this very room on the aforementioned occasion and date. A few weeks ago the distinguished representative of Sweden, Ambassador Hyltenius, put forward to this plenary a proposal to guide the possible solution of the perennially postponed problem of the expansion of the Conference on Disarmament. I should like to thank Ambassador Hyltenius for his interest and efforts, and I am pleased to agree with the basic outline of his analysis. It does not seem possible to maintain the formula of an increase limited to four members, if only because of the disappearance of the German Democratic Republic, which will oblige us to fill a fifth seat; nor to

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maintain the present situation until the political groups in the Conference finish restructuring themselves. It is very likely that in the near future the General Assembly will have to take a very firm stand to clarify this entire subject and the modus operandi in this matter. But in any event, for the reasons already given, it will prove difficult to maintain the agreement in principle reached in 1983, and another figure will probably have to be set taking into account, inter alia, the fact that no expansion has been possible for such a long time.

Filling the vacancy that has arisen in the Conference on Disarmament is, we might say, inevitable. Expanding the Conference on Disarmament today by only four members, to our mind, would amount to upholding an approach decided upon eight long years ago as though nothing had changed on the international scene. It would thus be logical and practical, as well as realistic, for this assembly to begin considering soon an expansion substantially greater than the one envisaged almost a decade ago. That is the interest of my delegation and its proposal, which I commend today to the attention of this Conference on Disarmament, trusting that they will be favourably considered.

I cannot resist the temptation to refer to a curious fact, that from the observers' seats I am speaking to you in a room that was dedicated to Francisco de Vitoria, and decorated by a Spanish artist named José María Sert, with bronze doors on your right and left, Mr. President, bearing the names of Vásquez Menchaca and Suárez respectively. It seems surprising that there should not soon be a place around the table of this Conference for a country such as Spain. Thank you for your interest and your patience.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Spain for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Canada, Ambassador Shannon.

Mr. SHANNON (Canada): Mr. President, I welcome your opening statement both for its brevity and for its clarity of purpose. It reinforces my confidence that under your firm leadership, both for the remainder of this part of our session, during the subsequent break, and for the beginning of the third and final phase of our work this year, we shall find the necessary will that you referred to, as well as the flexibility and courage, to advance our work, particularly on chemical weapons. There are, of course, other important subjects with which we have to deal, as well as such issues as our programme of work in the period after 4 September; the matter of the enlargement of the CD membership; and the possibility of further improving the effectiveness of our procedures.

I will speak to certain of those subjects later in this statement but I would like to begin by offering you my delegation's full support and by expressing our thanks to your predecessors as President this year, Ambassadors Solesby, Batsanov, Hyltenius and Rasaputram, for their leadership while in office. I would also like to join in welcoming those new heads of delegation who have come to the CD since last I spoke in plenary. And I would like to take this opportunity to say a special word of both congratulations

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and farewell to our colleague Nabil El Araby. I am certain that my colleagues at our Permanent Mission in New York will enjoy and benefit from working with him as much as we have here in Geneva.

I will in due course speak to a number of subjects that relate directly to our work here at the CD. But before doing so there are some more general remarks that I wish to make, relating in particular to Canada's heightened interest in non-proliferation issues. The area of arms control is one where the lessons of the recent war in the Persian Gulf are most relevant. The aggression perpetrated against Kuwait by Iraq clearly demonstrated to all of us the dangers to the maintenance of international peace and security posed by excessive accumulations of conventional weapons. Moreover, Iraq's threats to resort to the use of chemical weapons highlighted the urgent need for the international community to mobilize political will to address the proliferation both of weapons of mass destruction and of their delivery systems.

In response to these problems, Prime Minister Mulroney, in February, launched an initiative designed to foster progress on some of the most pressing security issues of our time. This initiative stressed the need for political impetus to achieve early progress in the various arms control disarmament negotiations and other efforts that were then already under way to address proliferation issues. The Prime Minister also outlined specific measures that Canada itself would pursue, in the appropriate forums, to stengthen international non-proliferation régimes. At the political level, Canada is now therefore taking action to ensure that arms control and proliferation are given consideration at all appropriate high-level meetings in which we participate.

The first of these meetings was the recent General Assembly of the Organization of American States, at which Canada introduced a resolution entitled "Cooperation for security in the hemisphere. Curbing the proliferation of instruments of war and weapons of mass destruction". This resolution, which was co-sponsored by 22 States, including Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Peru, was adopted by consensus. The resolution expressed strong support for international efforts to eliminate all forms of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; and urged all members of the international community to exercise sensitivity in the transfer of arms and related technologies. It also requested the Permanent Council of OAS to study problems posed to international security by the proliferation of instruments of war and to examine the possibility of exchanging information on national policies governing the transfer and procurement of arms, including the establishment of a mechanism for consultations about situations where excessive arms build-ups would appear to be developing.

Earlier this month, Canada, at the ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council, jointly with its NATO allies, reiterated its commitment to the earliest possible achievement of advances in the various forums dealing with proliferation issues. Canada was also active in pursuit of this objective at last week's CSCE meeting of foreign ministers in Berlin. The results are reflected in the following paragraph summarizing the conclusions of the meeting: "In the light of the recent experience in the

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Gulf region the ministers see a need to halt the spread of weapons of mass destruction and for restraint and transparency in the transfer of conventional weapons and weapons technologies, particularly to regions of tension. This should be a priority of CSCE Governments, and ministers agreed to maintain a dialogue on these issues among CSCE countries." Canada also looks forward to exchanging views with its G-7 partners on proliferation issues at the upcoming London summit.

My Government is pleased to note the widespread interest and constructive proposals to respond to the challenges of concluding and implementing effective arms control measures that have recently been enunciated by several other Governments. We support President Busn's proposal that the five permanent members of the Security Council, who are the principal arms exporters to the Middle East, enter into discussions to establish guidelines on the restraint of conventional and other arms transfers to that region. While President Bush's proposal deals with a specific region of chronic tension and high levels of armament, Canada believes that his initiative has the potential to provide useful experience that should be of relevance in a broader context.

The plan announced earlier this month by President Mitterrand of France is also very constructive and closely parallels Canadian thinking in the area of arms control and weapons proliferation.

The programme of action that Canada is now pursuing seeks to consolidate and strengthen instruments that are already in place or which are currently under negotiation. The scope of our programme encompasses the full range of weapons of mass destruction as well as conventional arms.

Nuclear proliferation, despite the great success of the non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), remains of great concern to Canada. We regard the NPT as the best instrument currently at the international community's disposal to effectively prevent horizontal proliferation and thereby to ensure a stable international environment that, in turn, is conducive to continued nuclear disarmament on the part of the nuclear-weapon States. Thus, Canada favours universal adherence to this Treaty. We are also very pleased that the number of States party to the NPT continues to grow and we particularly welcome the recent accessions of Zambia and Tanzania, and as well the announcement by France that it too has taken the decision in principle to accede. In keeping with the great importance that Canada attaches to the NPT, we strongly support the Treaty's indefinite extension in 1995.

It is our conviction that our ongoing efforts to ensure against the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons must be accompanied by continued efforts by the nuclear-weapon States to reduce their nuclear arsenals. Canada looks forward to the conclusion of a START agreement in the very near future and we urge the United States and the Soviet Union to follow up that treaty with further negotiations aimed at additional deep cuts in their nuclear arsenals and I would here also like to express to you, Sir, and to Ambassador Batsanov, our great appreciation for the regular debriefings on progress in the START process which you have arranged to provide to us, most recently those by Ambassadors Nazarkin and Brooks last week.

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The early conclusion of a global, comprehensive and effectively verifiable chemical weapons convention is another very high-priority Canadian arms control and disarmament objective. We believe that this objective is possible and realistic, and that some time not too late in 1992 we can together achieve it. We will spare no effort to meet that goal.

In the related area of biological and toxin weapons, a Convention is already in place that has been developed over the years to include confidence-building measures and improved consultation procedures. Canada looks forward to the third review conference of the biological and toxin weapons Convention later this year because it gives us the opportunity to build upon existing measures. In particular, we favour the review conference establishing a clear mandate and time frame for the detailed examination of a compliance regime, including fact-finding provisions, so as to strengthen further the effectiveness of this Convention.

Closely related to the issue of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is that of capability to deliver such weapons. As a founding partner of the Missile Technology Control Régime, Canada favours the enhancement of measures to ensure against the proliferation of missile technology and encourages non-partners to the MTCR to adhere to its guidelines. The area of conventional weapons, specifically the excessive accumulation of such arms, is one that has not received adequate attention in the past. Indeed, despite increasing acknowledgement of the great importance of this matter, as evidenced in a number of earlier plenary statements this session, no forum currently exists to consider the transfer of conventional arms and the possible negative consequences that might result from such transfers. In Canada's view, transparency, consultation and restraint could provide an appropriate framework to effectively address the threat of excessive conventional arms accumulations. In order to enhance confidence among States through transparency, we favour the early establishment of a voluntary information exchange system regarding arms transfers, under United Nations auspices.

For its part, Canada released this year our first "Annual report on the export of military goods from Canada". Consultation among States on apparent excessive arms build-ups can take place in a range of multilateral forums and can encourage participants to demonstrate greater sensitivity in the transfer of conventional arms. Finally, transparency and consultation should also encourage States to exercise restraint in their arms exports or acquisition and to take other appropriate measures when it is evident that excessive accumulations are occurring.

To conclude this portion of my remarks, I would like to stress that Canada believes the months ahead offer opportunities for decisive action in addressing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and excessive build-ups of conventional weapons. Canada looks forward to working closely with you and with all States to ensure that these opportunities are exploited to the fullest.

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Now let me turn briefly to some of the subjects on the current CD agenda. I have already referred briefly to the ongoing negotiations on chemical weapons. Although the task of assessing the results of this second part of the 1991 session on chemical weapons is one that must await the reports of the Ad Hoc Committee Chairman and his colleagues, it is already apparent that our work has benefited enormously from the important policy statement by President Bush last month. Canada both welcomed and applauded that statement - not only did it demonstrate a welcomed flexibility on two of the major issues before us, but, through its commitment to resolve the remaining outstanding issues and complete the convention within the next year, it provided a much-needed impetus to our negotiations.

As a direct result of that statement, major progress has been achieved in Working Group A, under Mr. Mashhadi's able guidance, in resolving uncertainties over the question of CW use. The text emerging from that Group's discussions on article I - the article that sets forth the fundamental principles of this convention - now more clearly bans the use of CW by States parties in any circumstances whatsoever, including retaliatory use, use against a non-State party, or use against any persons or places anywhere. This is a major achievement, one that we hope will serve to encourage universal adherence to the convention. In light of this, I should like to reaffirm the undertaking made by a predecessor of mine several years ago that Canada will re-examine its reservations to the 1925 Geneva Protocol with a view to withdrawing these reservations once the CW convention has come into effect. We call upon all other States that have not yet done so to make a similar commitment, and I welcome in that respect the important statement made this morning by the Ambassador of Spain.

Mr. President, your Government's reaffirmed commitment to the total destruction of its CW stockpile under the convention, has, we think, successfully laid to rest concerns felt by many here about the implications of the proposals contained in CD/CW/WP.303. As such, we consider that the clear and unequivocal commitment of States parties to destroy their CW stockpiles will serve as a powerful incentive for those of us who do not possess CW to adhere to the convention.

These of course are not the only areas of our work in which there have been important developments. Rather than catalogue these, however, I should like to focus on the area that we consider most vital for ensuring an effective convention, and that is the question of verification. We and others have long argued that effective verification is essential to persuading States - both CW-possessors and non-possessors - that their security concerns regarding CW can best be addressed through this convention. And in the course of these negotiations, we have been persuaded that effective verification requires two fundamental elements: a comprehensive routine system that allows on-site inspection of any facility that might have direct relevance to the convention, backed up by a strong and meaningful challenge inspection - or "inspection on request" - procedure that ensures that any doubts that one State party might harbour about the compliance of another State party can be ultimately resolved. The two are not mutually exclusive but they are mutually reinforcing. And both will be most effective if both are developed to their optimum potential.

(Mr. Shannon, Canada)

We therefore find it very encouraging that the discussions this session on a comprehensive, integrated verification system under article VI have been so constructive. In large measure, this has been due to the sensitive leadership shown by Mr. Gizowski, but all participants in the Working Group deserve credit for their willingness to explore seriously the best means of achieving an effective régime for article VI. We have every confidence that if we continue this approach we will ultimately succeed in devising a system that is of maximum effectiveness at optimum cost-effectiveness. Similarly, we hope that our future discussions on article XI verification will be equally constructive and positive.

I said that I did not want to catalogue the achievements of this second part of the 1991 session and I shall not. But I would be remiss if I did not acknowledge the achievements being made in Working Group C, under the leadership of Mr. Perugini, ably assisted by his amicus curiae, Professor Ronzitti, on a number of difficult legal and institutional issues. Canada particularly appreciates the progress achieved to date in resolving an issue of considerable importance to us, and that is "jurisdiction and control". If this issue can ultimately be settled along the lines of the present discussions, then Canada will have markedly greater confidence in its ability to honour fully all of its obligations under the convention.

Some observers not participating in our negotiations might wonder why we are paying such close attention to issues such as "jurisdiction and control", but we here are all aware that the details can be devilishly difficult. None more so, perhaps, than those confronting our two "Friends of the Chair" on technical issues, Messrs. Meerburg and Canonne. May I thus take this opportunity to thank them both for their patient efforts to lead us through the technical thickets of the schedules and guidelines and the problem of how to define "capability"?

I need not remind you that a further major element in President Bush's statement last month was the call to engage in continuous negotiations here until the outstanding issues have been resolved. Canada supports this call, we welcome the CD's decision to radically reduce the July break, and we are prepared to endorse further radical adjustments in our schedule in the forthcoming months to realize our goal. We have some tough decisions still ahead of us on verification but an effective CW convention now is within our grasp. With a relatively modest additional sacrifice of our time and energy, we should be able to complete our negotiations in the next few months.

Last year, I had the honour to be appointed Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on outer space. It was a difficult task. We are very pleased that this year, under the able chairmanship of Ambassador Roberto García Moritán of Argentina, the Ad Hoc Committee has begun to focus in greater detail on questions of terminology and definition. It has always been Canada's view that we can only achieve progress on this item if we have first been able to agree on the meaning of certain of the basic concepts involved. Two of my predecessors as Canadian Ambassador here had earlier addressed this issue in this forum and I am delighted now to be able to report to them that,

(Mr. Shannon, Canada)

however informally, the Committee is tackling the question of terminology and definitions through a friend of the Chair, Mr. Monkton of the United Kingdom delegation.

Canada is one among those countries which, without wanting to confuse the two distinct mandates of this Conference and of the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, believe that there may be areas of complementarity in which each can learn from the other. The question of establishing an agreed terminology and definitions is one such area, as has been pointed out by the friend of the Chair who is coordinating this particular subject, and I wish him well. I am also pleased that another friend of the Chair will be exploring the feasibility of ensuring increased transparency in the use of space, as a first step toward confidence-building measures. I want to take this opportunity to welcome the Soviet working paper, tabled as document CD/OS/WP.45, which we consider to be a useful compendium of existing confidence-building proposals and which we hope may help us to focus on the most promising avenues which should be followed in this area. Canada's interest in the peaceful use of space remains very high. Many of you will be aware that in October 1991 we will host a meeting of the International Astronomical Federation in Montreal and that, immediately before the IAF meeting, there will be a workshop for developing countries on space, co-sponsored by Canada, the United Nations and IAF.

On another subject, this year, Canada, in the person of my colleague Ron Robertson, has been honoured with the responsibility of chairing the Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons. Together with the two coordinators of tracks A and B, Mr. Omene and Mr. Dimitrov, he is actively working further to refine the draft texts in order to advance progress on both tracks. I believe that this process is going quite well, particularly with respect to track A where one of the only really major issues still to be resolved is that of scope and definition of a radiological weapon. The older alternative language texts on these points have been extensively analysed and reviewed and interesting new proposals designed to resolve the issue have been put forward. If the members of the Ad Hoc Committee can agree on some form of language which will successfully exclude from the purview of the draft treaty nuclear weapons as such, then a major hurdle will have been overcome. Work on track "B" is also progressing but the subject under consideration, a prohibition or restriction of attacks on nuclear facilities, is both more complex and more contentious.

Before I conclude, let me say a few words about a nuclear test-ban treaty. Canada is a strong supporter of the objective of a comprehensive test-ban treaty and we have been active in advancing this goal here and at the United Nations General Assembly, in the First Committee. We recognize that conditions are not yet ripe for the conclusion of a CTBT. None the less, we believe that much valuable work can be done in this forum that will contribute to the eventual realization of this goal. Furthermore, we believe that bilateral negotiations on nuclear testing between the United States and the USSR can conclude additional significant interim steps on the road to a CTBT that could include limitations on the yield and number of tests. We urge the United States and the USSR to pursue the negotiation and implementation of

(Mr. Shannon, Canada)

such interim measures. Important as the CTBT goal is, Canada is convinced that it is not in the interest of international security to link progress toward this specific objective with the extension of the NPT, as was suggested by some at the fourth review conference of that Treaty, last year.

Finally, a word about improved and effective functioning, where our colleague Ambassador Kamal of Pakistan continues to lead our discussions with great distinction. It is matter of the CD's agenda, particularly in a post-chemical-weapons-convention-negotiations phase, that we believe should be the focus of our attention. We would favour dropping or the merger of some items on which little progress has been made over many years; and we would welcome additional issues being brought in for consideration. It is clear, however, that not all CD members share this view and that at least for now we may have to settle for less substantive, more procedural changes. In that respect we welcome the recent French proposals for dealing more efficiently with applications from non-member States wishing to participate in our work and recommend that we adopt them.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Canada for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. I have no other delegation listed to address the plenary. Does any other member wish to take the floor at this stage? I see none.

May I recall that, immediately after this plenary meeting, there will be an informal open-ended consultation on the improved and effective functioning of the Conference, in this conference room with full services?

I have no other business for today and intend now to adjourn this plenary meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held two days from now, on Thursday, 27 June, at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 11.15 a.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.598
27 June 1991

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE FIVE HUNDRED AND NINETY-EIGHTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 27 June 1991, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Stephen J. Ledogar (United States of America)

GE.91-61525/3314B

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 598th meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

I have on my list of speakers today the representatives of Poland, the Republic of Korea, Sri Lanka, Indonesia and Pakistan. I now give the floor to the representative of Poland, Mr. Gizowski.

Mr. GIZOWSKI (Poland): Mr. President, it is a great honour for me to address the Conference on Disarmament during your presidency. I should like to congratulate you on the assumption of this responsible post, fully confident that you will steer our deliberations with your well-known efficiency and skill. I also wish to thank Ambassador Solesby for her excellent work as your immediate predecessor in the Chair. I also extend our sincere words of welcome to the newly arrived heads of delegations and pledge to them our full cooperation.

As we approach the end of the second part of the 1991 session of the Conference, I should like to devote my statement today almost exclusively to the question of chemical weapons. This not only reflects the very high priority attached by my country to the earliest possible conclusion of a chemical weapons convention, but also stems from a qualitatively new situation which has emerged in this regard in the last few weeks.

Year after year the delegations, including my own, repeated in their plenary statements that the CW convention was within our reach. At that time it proved to be more an expression of hope than of a reality. Today we are facing the possibility of a genuine breakthrough in our prolonged negotiations. This is due, first of all, to the initiative undertaken by the President of the United States, which was introduced by you, Mr. President, at this forum on 16 May. My Government wholeheartedly welcomes President Bush's announcement forswearing the use of chemical weapons for any reason, including retaliation, against any State. Together with the commitment of the United States to destroy unconditionally all their stocks of chemical weapons within 10 years of the entry into force of the convention, it opens new promising possibilities of solving outstanding issues expeditiously and accelerating further negotiations on the convention. We highly appreciate the offer of technical assistance on safe and environmentally sound destruction of chemical weapons, which could greatly facilitate the smooth implementation of the convention. Altogether it provides fresh momentum towards the attainment of our ultimate goal of a world free of chemical weapons.

The positive reaction of other delegations to this initiative enabled us to reach a consensus on the necessity to accelerate the work with a view of completing the chemical weapons convention by 1992. We believe that it is the responsibility of the whole Conference on Disarmament, and not only the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, to ensure that the elaboration of the convention receives the highest priority, particularly in cases when due to limited resources in terms of availability of time or conference services there might be a need to make the necessary adjustment in consideration of various issues.

(Mr. Gizowski, Poland)

This does not mean of course that my delegation seeks to belittle the significance of other items on the agenda of the Conference. Some of those items are indeed of vital importance and should certainly stay also in the future as priority topics for negotiations in this forum. Some others, no less important from the substantive point of view, but not yet ripe as subjects for negotiating international conventions or agreements, are perhaps better suited for future discussions in other forums, such as the United Nations Disarmament Commission. But in any case, as far as the present moment is concerned, I am convinced that it is in the deepest interest of the Governments represented in this hall and the whole international community to concentrate efforts on elaborating the chemical weapons convention. Prompt, successful conclusion of the convention would add immensely to the credibility of this Conference as the unique multilateral body in the field of disarmament. And what is even more important, the conclusion of the convention, after the INF and CFE agreements and hopefully also after a START agreement, would become a step of enormous significance in building a safer world, in constructing a new infrastructure of security based not on military might but on cooperation among States.

I shall come back to the question of the chemical weapons convention later in my statement today. Now I wish to emphasize that we did notice and consider of great importance other initiatives, proposals and ideas which have been put forward in the last few months in this forum or which are directly connected with the work of the Conference on Disarmament. I have in mind first and foremost the plan for arms control and disarmament submitted by the President of France on 3 June this year. We welcome, in particular, the decision of France in principle to accede to the non-proliferation Treaty and we remain convinced that it will give a strong stimulus to the process of further universalization of the Treaty.

The Conference has been addressed this year by eminent personalities from a number of countries. The statements by our distinguished guests, as well as numerous interventions by heads of delegations, have given the Conference abundant material for thinking and analysing. Several ideas have been put forward with regard to the future activities of the Conference, after the conclusion of the chemical weapons convention. Particular emphasis has been placed on the question of limitation of international arms transfers. All those ideas merit careful consideration. The Polish delegation has taken note of them and will present its position in due course. As of now we can say that we regard some of the suggestions as extremely interesting and worthy of full support.

Reverting to the question of the chemical weapons convention, I cannot but fully agree with what you, Mr. President, in your capacity as the head of the United States delegation, stated when introducing President Bush's message to the Conference, namely that we cannot afford to continue with "business as usual" in our negotiations. My delegation is gratified at the fact that recently the Conference adopted several decisions conducive to the intensification and speedy conclusion of the negotiations on a chemical weapons ban, including the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee and allocation of

(Mr. Cizowski, Poland)

additional time for negotiations. We are prepared to go along with any further suggestions in terms of time and effort needed to accelerate negotiations.

We believe, however, that the question of intensification is not only a problem of time but also, and perhaps in the first place, a problem of will to compromise on the part of all the participants and the necessity to give a fresh look to those issues which are blocking us from achieving the final agreement. It is our firm belief that with a real will to work intensely and to "give and take", we should be able to resolve all key outstanding issues before the end of this year.

One of these issues is undoubtedly verification. The discussion conducted on this issue so far has confirmed once again that the future verification regime should provide for adequate measures of verification satisfactory to all parties concerned in order to create the necessary confidence and assurance that the convention is being observed by all parties. An effective verification system will promote the implementation of the convention by building confidence and deterring any possible violations. We all agree at least on one point - that a 100 per cent infallible verification system is just not feasible. But this does not mean that a reasonable level of assurance to the States parties that the convention is being complied with is not achievable. In principle, the basic outlines of such a system have already been written into the present "rolling text". Verification provisions dealing with chemical weapons stocks and production facilities are well elaborated and, with some refinement, they could serve properly for the effective implementation of chemical disarmament. The same is true about verifying schedule 1 facilities. There are still two major outstanding issues in the area of verification on which a solution should be found, namely the remaining part of article VI on activities not prohibited under the convention and article IX, in particular the question of inspection on request.

There is a substantial distinction between the two types of inspection. At the same time, however, both of them embody two concepts: confidence and deterrence, although the proportion among these two factors is different. While in inspection on request the deterrence factor prevails, in the case of verification activities under article VI confidence plays a leading role. This proportion is, in our opinion, quite natural. Any verification system conceived under article VI should be based on declared activities and should serve mainly as a confidence-building measure. Still, a certain degree of deterrence should be preserved. From this point of view we welcome the broadening of the scope of verification under this article. We share the opinion that it will be quite difficult to sift relevant facilities from irrelevant ones. That is why we prefer a broader approach, even risking sometimes the inclusion into the scope of declarations of facilities which are not posing a particular risk to the objectives of the convention. One might question whether any State would choose to use a declared facility for illicit weapons manufacture in the first place. The very fact that on-site inspections can take place is a significant deterrent. When making this assumption in combination with a broad scope of facilities which could be included into the declarations we are already increasing confidence substantially. Here we come

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to grips with the question of how to provide adequate resources to verify treaty compliance effectively. We should be careful not to overburden the future technical secretariat with the enormous task of verifying the obvious cases and spending on this a huge amount of the Organization's budget. We were quite concerned about constantly increasing tasks of the future Organization, especially in the verification area, without being confident that this was adding to the efficiency of the implementation process. Taking this into account, certain elements in the Swedish proposal for an "integrated approach" are quite attractive to us. The crux of the matter is in the selection process. To be effective, it should combine, in our opinion, the involvement of the States parties as well as that of the technical secretariat. Our experience with the implementation of confidence-building measures in the context of the Stockholm agreement - although I am aware of differences between these two concepts - shows that when the request is treated as something normal and routine the confrontational character can be easily avoided.

The key issue in the overall verification system under the chemical weapons convention remains, however, inspection on request. We know that in spite of the fact that it is not now directly on the table this issue is not dormant. We do hope that in the rather near future it will reappear on the negotiating table. We consider inspection on request as a prerequisite for confidence that the convention is being complied with. This was one of the reasons why we undertook a trial inspection on request of Soviet military facilities located on Polish territory, a report on which will soon be presented to the Conference on Disarmament.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Poland for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I note the presence in this plenary meeting this morning of the new representative of Romania, Ambassador Romulus Neagu, to whom I extend the warm welcome of the Conference. I apologize, Sir, that I did not note your presence before the first speaker. I now give the floor to the representative of the Republic of Korea, Ambassador Park.

Mr. PARK (Republic of Korea): Mr. President, as this is the first time I have taken the floor in this forum, on behalf of my delegation and myself I wish to extend to you our warm congratulations on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament and to wish you every success in discharging your important responsibility. The determination that you demonstrated in your opening statement the day before yesterday to conclude the chemical-weapons-ban treaty by 1992 is a good indication of the firm leadership with which you are going to lead us to productive results of our debate on disarmament. I would also like to express our sincere appreciation to the preceding Presidents, Ambassador Rasaputram of Sri Lanka, Ambassador Hyltenius of Sweden, Ambassador Batsanov of the USSR and Ambassador Solesby of the United Kingdom, for the excellent manner in which they presided over the Conference. I also would like to take this opportunity to extend my high regards to Ambassador Komatina, Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament, and his staff for their invaluable assistance in making the necessary arrangements and preparations for this Conference.

(Mr. Park, Republic of Korea)

The months of the second part of the Conference on Disarmament have been characterized by a series of events and disarmament initiatives. The European security system underwent major reforms and changes to ensure that European security keeps pace with the newly emerging international order. With its dissolution in April, the Warsaw Treaty Organization no longer exists. And the NATO Defence Ministers' meeting followed by a Foreign Ministers' meeting, convened in early June, attempted to reorient the only remaining military alliance body in Europe to better serve the peace and stability of an enlarged Europe.

The overhaul, we think, will have far-reaching implications for the future of both Europe and the world.

The CFE Treaty negotiations cleared the remaining hurdle when the Foreign Ministers of the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to resolve their key differences during their meeting in Lisbon on 1 June. The breakthrough along with the progress in the START negotiations will pave the way for the summit for the finalization of the conventional and strategic arms treaties. When the CFE Treaty is ratified, it will be another major disarmament achievement in the area of conventional weapons, and will certainly brighten prospects for the commencement of the CFE-II negotiations.

It is ironic that the world witnessed the eruption of war in the Gulf just as the warming international climate was thawing the icy remnants of cold war tensions. Was it an isolated incident or was it indicative of the uncertainty caused by multi-polarity in world politics? Whichever the case, the event revealed the volatile nature of regional conflicts and provoked serious thought on regional security and stability. If any lesson can be drawn from the experience of the Gulf war, it would be the renewed awareness of the importance of the United Nations role in these obviously uncertain times. The world body has proved itself as a focal point in bringing parties together for dialogue and collective action. New light has been shed on the potential of the United Nations Security Council in safeguarding regional peace and security and enforcing arms control.

The perils of the transfer of arms are another lesson of the Gulf war and pose additional complications for the problem of regional security. Arms transfer has been a long-standing agenda item in United Nations disarmament forums, but few workable formulas have been produced to tackle the problem, particularly with respect to tension-ridden regions. In view of the changing international political environment and the growing importance of regional security, it is necessary to take a fresh look at the ramifications of arms transfers in the regional and global arena.

In this regard, the Middle East arms control initiative proposed by President Bush of the United States on 29 May is timely and appropriate, as it envisions guidelines for halting the proliferation of conventional as well as non-conventional weapons. As the Government of the Republic of Korea has consistently supported international efforts to curb arms proliferation, we welcome the initiative and wish to express our hope that it will help to consolidate the region's peace and security with the cooperation of the

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countries involved. An equally important arms control initiative in a much broader context is the arms control and disarmament plan put forward by President Mitterrand of France on 3 June. The French initiative, among other things, underlines the role and responsibility of the United Nations as an important factor in combating the problem of arms proliferation. As elaborated by the proposal, the reduction of tensions and the removal of sources of conflict are of primary importance. Such efforts combined with enhancement of transparency and confidence-building are essential in the arms control process. In our view, the two proposals of the United States and France are mutually supportive and complementary, and, therefore, a good starting-point in the pursuit of a generally applicable formula.

Thanks to the exhaustive review that has been made of the effective functioning of the Conference on Disarmament, more time has been allocated to negotiation - the substantive part of the CD's functioning - with the change in the schedule of the annual session and the reduction in the overall number of plenary meetings. Pertinent to this line of innovative restructuring is the issue of the extension of CD membership. In spite of the collapse of the cold war that has done away with the East-West dichotomy, disarmament continues to be one of the utmost challenges confronting the world. The increasing number of aspirants to full CD membership is a clear reflection of concerns on disarmament. In this regard, equitable geographical distribution as well as military significance are, inter alia, the factors to be taken into account. In keeping with the changing international realities, careful consideration should continue to be given to keeping the CD's organization and work up to date.

The draft convention on the chemical weapons ban is one of the most crucial and promising items on the Conference's agenda and has raised hopes and expectations for the early conclusion of the convention. In our view, the key to the success of the convention on chemical weapons lies in assuring universal adherence to the convention. We share the view of other delegations that universal adherence could best be ensured by making the convention effective, non-discriminatory and verifiable. To this end, we wish to underline the importance of ironing out the remaining differences for the establishment of an effective verification regime. Such a regime would enhance confidence in the convention by assuring each State party that other States parties remain in full compliance.

President Bush of the United States made an announcement on 13 May on the United States unconditional commitment to the destruction of all of its stocks of chemical weapons within 10 years of the convention coming into force. President Bush's new arms control initiative is most welcome and represents a positive and far-sighted step toward achieving universal adherence to the chemical weapons convention.

The outbreak of chemical warfare was an ominous possibility during the Gulf war, and the world was alerted to its potentially catastrophic consequences. Despite progress made in disarmament negotiations between the two super Powers and in Europe, and the recent conclusion of the Gulf war, the danger of chemical weapons use has not completely disappeared. The time is

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ripe to take advantage of every possible opportunity to broaden support for the early and successful conclusion of the convention, in the same way that momentum was created by the Paris Ministerial Conference and the Canberra Government-Industry Conference in 1989.

The convention on banning chemical weapons and the Convention prohibiting biological weapons are twin branches of the same tree. The third review conference of the biological weapons Convention will be held in September in Geneva. The Republic of Korea has always supported international efforts to eradicate weapons of mass destruction. My country, as a party to the Convention since 1987, will be represented at the review conference and will make an active contribution to making the Convention effective and lasting.

The fourth review conference of the NPT, held in Geneva in August-September last year, and the amendment conference of the partial test-ban Treaty, convened in New York in early January this year, were the two major events highlighting the serious differences among the States parties over the issue of a complete test ban. The linkage approach to a CTB at the fourth review conference of the NPT yielded no concrete results, left the future of the NPT after 1995 uncertain and made the other important agreements superfluous. We are hopeful, however, that this does not represent a total setback, but a temporary one before a leap forward towards a universal NPT. We welcome France's decision announced on 3 June to join the NPT. France's accession to the NPT will strengthen the authority of the Treaty and reinforce worldwide pressure to bring those countries outside of the Treaty into the non-proliferation regime.

The unsafeguarded nuclear facilities of the States parties to the NPT, particularly North Korea, reportedly possessing significant nuclear facilities, have been the subject of international concern. In international forums such as the IAEA and NPT conferences, a great number of States parties, both individually and collectively, have called for the early and speedy conclusion by such countries of safeguards agreements with IAEA.

The Conference of the Inter-Parliamentary Union, hosted by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in Pyongyan in April-May, neither alleviated nor diminished worldwide apprehension over the unsafeguarded nuclear programmes of the States parties. IPU attempted to remedy the situation by adopting a resolution urging these States parties to subject their nuclear facilities to IAEA inspection. Very recently, it was revealed that IAEA has been informed by North Korea of the latter's intention to resume negotiations on a safeguards agreement with IAEA in July, with a view to submitting the agreement to the IAEA Board of Governors for approval at its September session. If the Democratic People's Republic of Korea indeed proves its intention through concrete action, as laid down in article 3 of the NPT and other relevant regulations of IAEA, and with no conditions attached, it will be the first major step for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in easing the worldwide suspicion hanging over its reportedly significant nuclear facilities.

(Mr. Park, Republic of Korea)

The signing of a safeguards agreement with IAEA is an unqualified, mandatory obligation of the States parties to the NPT. The conditions attached by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to submission to IAEA inspection cannot be justified by any means. As the unsafeguarded nuclear programmes of States parties represent a serious threat to regional and international peace and security, efforts should be intensified for the realization of their full-fledged commitment to an IAEA safeguards agreement at the earliest date.

In his address at the forty-third session of the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1988, President Roh Tae Woo of the Republic of Korea proposed a consultative conference for peace in north-east Asia in order to lay a solid foundation for durable peace and prosperity in the region. The proposal was made in an effort to create a favourable international environment more conducive to peace and reunification of the Korean peninsula within the framework of regional security in north-east Asia. It is particularly to be noted that the necessity of convening such forums has also been felt by other countries with their subsequent proposals in a similar vein.

These days the Korean peninsula has often been described as the last remaining arena of cold war confrontation. Fortunately, it now appears inevitable that North-South relations will thaw under the continuing warmth of the international political climate. By virtue of our efforts to improve relations with those countries whose ideologies and political systems acted as hindrances in the past, the political climate surrounding the Korean peninsula has steadily improved and has become increasingly conducive to stability and peace in the area. On 28 May, North Korea announced its decision to apply for United Nations membership, which we wholeheartedly welcomed. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea's acceptance of two separate United Nations memberships for North and South Korea opens the way for peaceful co-existence between the two parts of Korea and for normalization of inter-Korean relations pending the reunification of the country. The admission of both South and North Korea to the United Nations will help lay to rest the long-standing confrontation and enmity between the two sides and to promote dialogue and exchanges as responsible and peace-loving members of the international community.

The Prime Ministers of South and North Korea last year held three rounds of talks alternately in Seoul and Pyongyang, until they were suspended in January this year. Because of the deep-rooted mistrust and suspicion between the two parts of Korea born out of a long-drawn-out military confrontation, mutual opening, exchanges and cooperation are essential as a confidence-building process before any meaningful dialogue on matters of disarmament and arms control can commence. We have learned from Europe's experience that mutual openness and transparency are the basis for any disarmament talks.

There have been limited inter-Korean exchanges in the areas of performing arts and sports, giving rise to high expectations for future exchanges and confidence-building exercises in other areas. It is encouraging that some of our CBM proposals are also referred to in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's recent proposal on arms control on the Korean peninsular - namely,

(Mr. Park, Republic of Korea)

peaceful use of the Demilitarized Zone, installation of direct hot lines between the military authorities and advance notification of military exercises. With regard to the peaceful use of the Demilitarized Zone, in particular, I would like to recall that President Roh Tae Woo of the Republic of Korea in his address at the forty-third United Nations General Assembly proposed an idea of building a "city of peace" in the DMZ, where separated families could freely reunite, and broad trade and other kinds of exchanges could be facilitated.

We are more hopeful than before that, given the forthcoming United Nations membership of both North and South Korea, the suspended South-North Prime Ministers' talks will be resumed soon so that we can re-open dialogue on these vital confidence-building measures and other arms control issues and contribute to the disarmament process at the regional and global level.

As a responsible member of the international community, the Republic of Korea will spare no effort to help facilitate the implementation of the noble task of this Conference. Finally, in concluding, allow me to express the fervent wish of the Korean Government that the Conference on Disarmament, the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, will make a positive contribution to the promotion of world peace and security by successfully concluding the chemical weapons convention as early as possible, and that a breakthrough on other major issues of the CD, such as the nuclear test ban, will be made in the near future.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the Republic of Korea for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Sri Lanka, Ambassador Rasaputram.

Mr. RASAPUTRAM (Sri Lanka): Mr. President, let me at the very outset congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency. I am particularly pleased to do so as you represent a country with which Sri Lanka has traditionally close and friendly relations. Your diplomatic skills and initiative are well known and we are confident of a most successful conduct of the CD's business under your able guidance. I would also like to express my delegation's gratitude to your predecessor Ambassador Tessa Solesby of the United Kingdom who guided our work most efficiently and with great acceptance. May I also take this opportunity to join in extending a warm welcome to the newly arrived heads of delegations? We will greatly miss the company and contributions of Ambassador Nabil Elaraby of Egypt but would like to congratulate him for his new appointment and wish him well.

My statement today will focus on our negotiations on the chemical weapons convention. My delegation will revert to other priority items on our agenda and the question of the improved and effective functioning of the CD at a later stage. On the important question of the improved and effective functioning, my delegation hopes that the very useful exchange of views will continue under the able guidance of Ambassador Kamal.

(Mr. Rasaputram, Sri Lanka)

In our statement at the last session of the CD we expressed optimism that a comprehensive and global ban on chemical weapons was within reach. Recent developments have enhanced this optimism. We indeed believe that the CW negotiations have now entered a decisive, and hopefully, the terminal phase. We also stated then that the bulk of the "technical infrastructure" of the convention was in place and that remaining issues should be addressed in a political perspective with a view to taking decisions through compromises. We now feel that the negotiations are poised to move in that direction.

We welcome in this context the initiative by the President of the United States in announcing a most constructive change of position facilitating a consensus on the main prohibition of the convention covering the entire chemical weapons cycle including the unconditional destruction of CW stocks within the specified time-frame. We take satisfaction at the fact that this development has already led to the emergence of a consensus on article I of the Convention. The comprehensive character of the main prohibition that we now have, which is applicable in any circumstances whatsoever, will augur well for achieving the desired objective of universality. We hope that somewhat related issue of article XII will be resolved expeditiously. As my delegation sees it, the remaining issue relating to article XII involves both legal and political questions. Given the comprehensive and multilateral nature of the convention that we all hope for, it is important that we adopt innovative solutions to such problems. In this regard, the interesting idea put forward by the distinguished Ambassador of Austria is worthy of serious consideration by countries which have entered reservations to the 1925 Geneva Protocol. The possibility of a collective withdrawal of reservations would be an expression of greater political support for the kind of comprehensive regime envisaged under the convention. It would also amount to an important confidence-building measure, commensurate with the unconditional prohibition which we have already secured collectively.

A consensus having been reached in the Conference for an intensified work programme, for which we would like to thank Ambassador Batsanov, it is now important for the Committee to maintain the momentum of its work. We therefore hope that new substantive proposals aiming at developing a consensus acceptable to all delegations will be forthcoming on remaining major issues such as inspection on request. My delegation shares the view that the procedure for inspections on request is an important part of the verification regime to maintain the confidence of all countries, large and small, developed and developing. We also believe that in order to achieve this desired objective, the concept itself should retain its multilateral character and be depoliticized. Its intrusiveness and use should be managed in a way consistent with the objectives and the scope of the Convention. The new inputs expected, we hope, will address these aspects and lead to consensus.

In our statement to the CD on 22 March last year, my delegation referred to two aspects of a possible framework to facilitate solutions to remaining political questions. One was the desirability of a time-frame to conclude our negotiations and the other was the question whether we should look at a package format to handle remaining issues in the terminal phase of our negotiations. My delegation stated then:

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"We are inclined to believe that a time-frame for the conclusion of the convention could now be considered as a via media for seeking solutions to remaining issues. The questions relating to scope, the composition and decision-making of the Executive Council, challenge inspection, assistance, the order of destruction, economic and technological development and the Convention's relationship to the 1925 Geneva Protocol are issues which require political decisions in a spirit of compromise, bearing in mind the realities of desired universality. One could argue that these issues are politically interrelated in a manner that perhaps requires solutions in a package form during the terminal phase of negotiations."

We therefore take satisfaction at the fact that a consensus was achieved to infuse a sense of timing into the mandate of the Committee. In order to use the other aspect of a package framework we encourage the Chairman of the Committee to pursue his own consultations.

All are agreed that universality is the desired objective with regard to the implementation of the Convention. As has been pointed out by the Group of 21, a key to achieve this objective would be the internal consistency of the convention in maintaining the non-discriminatory and multilateral character of the treaty which now embodies a comprehensive and unconditional ban on the entire chemical weapons cycle. Consistency of these two principles should be equally applicable to the composition and decision-making process of the Executive Council.

Long-drawn-out efforts, both bilateral and multilateral, have contributed to developing the "rolling text" as it stands today. The authority of the consensus flowing from the Paris Conference and recent developments facilitating a consensus on the main prohibition augur well for the Committee to come to grips with other political issues, while parallel technical work should continue in working groups. Sri Lanka remains committed to the conclusion of the convention at the earliest possible date. I have been instructed by my Government to state that it is actively considering becoming an original signatory to the convention, when it is ready for signature upon conclusion.

The chemical weapons convention will be a unique instrument in terms of both its intrusiveness and its coverage of civilian industrial activity. It could also be the first international instrument which envisages, in one way or another, the concept of universality even before the conclusion of negotiations. While extra-convention means will always be available to promote universality, the most effective way of ensuring the widest possible participation would be to promote universality from within the text of the convention. The majority of the potential States parties will be countries which have never had chemical weapons and have no intention of acquiring them. It is therefore important that the convention does not entail undue and disproportionate institutional and financial burdens on such countries under the verification regime envisaged. As was pointed out by the distinguished Minister of New Zealand, it will be essential that the verification burdens of the convention should not discourage smaller countries from acceding. One

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cannot argue that the accession of militarily insignificant countries, which would in any case not pose a threat to the convention, is of less significance than a "capable" country remaining outside the convention.

It is in this context that my delegation would like to commend for serious consideration the pertinent observations of the delegation of Argentina concerning the need for the verification regime to remain commercially neutral and the importance of avoiding a dual regime for civil chemical trade once the convention enters into force. Developing countries which seek to develop their, as yet, elementary civilian chemical industry will have to weigh the security benefits of the convention against the costs and burdens not only of national implementation measures and international verification measures but also of the economic implications of possible dual regimes. The justified motives of devising an adequately comprehensive verification regime should not take us to the extreme of legislating for every eventuality. This would overburden the convention with an expensive verification regime that could go beyond the scope of the convention. Financing of such a regime can entail considerable financial obligations for developing countries. It will therefore be of importance to agree on a viable balance of verification burdens, bearing in mind that letter-perfect verification is neither feasible nor needed.

We feel that the opportunity now exists for the CD to strive towards firming up what could be the Conference's first conclusive output, since its inception over a decade ago. The consensus that was recently achieved on article I was the culmination of a long process. It also demonstrated the dynamism of multilateral negotiations and the fact that debilitating attributes sometimes conferred upon multilateral bodies are not justified. In fact the consensus on article I proved the contrary. The initial draft text of a CW convention submitted to the CD some years ago was enriched and developed in a dynamic way by multilateral participation. The very basis of the new consensus, namely, the idea of including the use of CW in the main prohibition, did not figure in the initial proposal but was conceived and developed by this multilateral body. The CD has therefore proved that it can negotiate, even on issues concerning weapons of mass destruction, if and when it is enabled to do so. Among the many tragedies and ironies of the Gulf war, some would perceive a realization that the threat of mass destruction deriving from chemical weapons neither deterred war nor influenced the outcome of that war. If this is to be one among many lessons to be drawn from that tragic event, it is perhaps time for the CD to pay more focused attention to other priority items on our agenda dealing with a host of disarmament questions including the priority nuclear issues which have remained in a state of paralysis due to similar doctrinal considerations. Irrespective of the moral of the Gulf conflict experience, if it has presented us with an opportunity to eliminate an entire class of weapons of mass destruction, the CD has to seize that opportunity.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Sri Lanka for his statement and for the kind words addressed to me. I now give the floor to the representative of Indonesia, Ambassador Rahardjo.

Mr. RAHARDJO (Indonesia): As I am speaking for the first time in the plenary session of this august body, allow me to warmly congratulate you, Mr. President, on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference. My delegation is confident that with your wisdom and customary aplomb doubled with long and vast experience, you will be able to discharge your task effectively and efficiently. Allow me also to extend my felicitations, through you, to Ambassador Solesby of the United Kingdom, who preceded you in the Chair, for the efficient and tactful manner in which she presided over our deliberations. On behalf of Ambassador Loeis of Indonesia, who had to leave the Conference very suddenly last April, I wish to extend his sincere thanks to all colleagues and friends at the Conference, as well as the members of the secretariat, for the cooperation rendered to him during his term as head of the Indonesian delegation to the Conference on Disarmament. He also requested me, on this occasion, to wish every success to all of the distinguished personalities taking part in this gathering, the delegates of both the members and the observer States, and all members of the secretariat. Through you, Mr. President, I also wish to extend a warm welcome to our new colleagues and ambassadors who have joined us since the start of this second session of the Conference.

My association with the Conference on Disarmament is at a time when the echo of the ongoing dynamic and fundamental changes in the global political climate seems to be having an effect on its work. The observations made on the progress of the negotiations on item 4 have made it clear to us all that tangible results could be realized in the near future, due to the conciliatory positions of the major parties, which will eventually pave the way for the speedy conclusion of the draft convention.

It is my delegation's view that a decision made by the major possessors of chemical weapons to abandon these weapons options and to totally eliminate them from their military arsenals would encourage others to do the same. Recent events in the Gulf have clearly demonstrated that the military value of these weapons is limited when in contest with other systems of sophisticated weaponry owned by a handful of the collective military Powers. The political costs of maintaining these abhorrent weapons for defence and military purposes in the future will be too high for any country to afford.

The change of position of the Government of the United States on the question of the use of chemical weapons has provided new impetus to the course of negotiations in the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. The new approach of the Governments of the United States and the USSR to the question of universal adherence has brought about a fresh resolve and has resulted in the emergence of a common will to achieve a final agreement as soon as possible on the establishment of a treaty on the total prohibition of these abhorrent weapons. My delegation welcomes this development and hopes that the future convention on chemical weapons will be a faithful reflection of the legitimate interests of the international community as a whole.

For a country like Indonesia, which has never possessed or developed such abhorrent weapons, the total prohibition of their use has always been regarded as a crucial element in the convention. We believe that the real danger of

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chemical weapons lies in the possible use or threat of use of these weapons, rather than the development or stockpiling of these weapons. In this context, the importance of provisions regulating assistance and protection in case of the use or threat of use of chemical weapons could well be emphasized in order to create a deterrent and thus lessen the chance of countries choosing chemical weapons for aggressive military purposes. My delegation also attaches particular importance to the provision governing the future possibility of the use or threat of use of such weapons by States which are not party to the convention. A provision which assures prompt assistance and protection to a State party which might be threatened or attacked by any State using chemical weapons may attract States to become party to the convention.

In the course of the negotiations of the last few years, the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons has not been able to reach agreement on the above question, which is due among other reasons to the thorny question of the threat of use of chemical weapons. Moreover, the question of the function of the future technical secretariat in providing assistance to States parties in need of assistance in case of the threat of use or use of chemical weapons has remained unresolved. If these pending questions are to be resolved, a new approach has to be developed. Any State or States parties to the convention which renounce chemical weapons options for their defence purposes and become parties to the convention should be entitled to receive assistance or protection against the use or threat of use of chemical weapons, with a view to preventing the real use of such weapons against this particular State or States parties. My delegation hopes that those which are in a position to do so will make a contribution either in cash, or in kind, through the assistance mechanism to be created under the auspices of the technical secretariat. At the same time efforts should also be pursued to make the technical secretariat function effectively so as to enable it to give prompt assistance to countries in need.

With regard to the interrelationship between the future chemical weapons convention and the 1925 Geneva Protocol, my delegation would like to emphasize that the provision governing such a relationship should be carefully and properly drafted so as to fully reflect the concerns and aspirations of the States parties to the convention. The future chemical weapons convention should avoid any possible confusion or loopholes which may lead to abuse by any State which is party to both the future convention and the 1925 Geneva Protocol.

While it is encouraging to note the wealth of ideas which have been put forward during the course of the negotiations on the convention on chemical weapons, my delegation considers it necessary to mention a number of points which are of relevance to us. With reference to the verification of non-production of chemical weapons in the chemical industry, we are all aware that a new concept based on an integrated approach has been introduced. This has altered the perceived concept of verification as envisaged in the "rolling text" of the last session of the Conference on Disarmament; among others the range of the target to be verified has been widened. The concept of "capable" facilities allows on-site inspection not only in those facilities which produce but also those which are able to produce or process scheduled

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chemicals. In this connection we would like to underline that the question of verification of non-production of chemical weapons in the chemical industry should be approached cautiously with a view to avoiding an unnecessary burden upon the developing countries which are still in the process of developing their chemical industry.

With reference to the effective functioning of the verification system of the convention, the Indonesian delegation welcomes the conduct of the meeting of the Technical Group on Instrumentation. Based on the experience gained from our participation in the meeting, it was learnt that the existing laboratories and research institutes in Indonesia are operating the same instrumentation as conceived to be used in the future verification system. As for the need to furnish inspectors for the future implementation of the verification system of the convention, I wish to express the appreciation of the Indonesian Government to the Government of Finland for granting the opportunity for Indonesian officials to participate in the training course for such inspectors. We earnestly hope that this initiative will be followed by other countries which are in a position to do so, with a view to improving the technical skills of the personnel for the smooth implementation of the convention.

While recognizing the importance of the total elimination of weapons of mass destruction, in particular chemical weapons, we should not lose sight of the need to pursue the efforts towards a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing, which is long overdue. It has been noted that the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban has resumed its work. We recognize that the progress of the work in the Committee in stemming further qualitative improvements of nuclear weaponry falls far short of expectations. There is still a tremendous amount of work ahead of us in order to conclude a comprehensive nuclear test-ban regime which will be universally adhered to. The resumption of the work of the Ad Hoc Committee is expected to be a good beginning. We hope that its endeavours will be instrumental in the overall effort to establish a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

During the PTBT Treaty Amendment Conference some constructive ideas were outlined. It was suggested inter alia by some that the verification proposals, namely the draft protocol presented to the Amendment Conference by the co-sponsor of the Conference, should be transmitted to the Conference on Disarmament for further consideration. My delegation is pleased to learn that the draft protocol regarding the verification of a nuclear test-ban treaty submitted by the co-sponsor of the PTBT Amendment Conference has been taken up by the Ad Hoc Committee. We hope that its result will contribute to the overall endeavours directed toward the establishment of a CTBT. As exemplified by a large number of United Nations General Assembly resolutions on a CTBT, and a clear mandate to the Conference as stipulated in the Final Document of SSOD-I, my delegation shares the view that a mandate to negotiate should be given to the Ad Hoc Committee in order to make the Committee work more effectively.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Indonesia for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. I would be grateful if he could trans-it our appreciation to Ambassador Loeis for his message to us. My predecessor has already expressed best wishes to him on his departure, and I should like now to join her in wishing the Ambassador best wishes in his new assignment. I now give the floor to our next speaker, the representative of Pakistan, Ambassador Kamal.

Mr. KAMAL (Pakistan): Mr. President, let me begin by expressing our happiness at seeing you in the Chair, the representative of a country with which Pakistan has always enjoyed a close relationship. We are confident that under your direction the work of the CD will be conducted efficiently and skilfully. On my part, I would like to assure you that you will receive the full cooperation of my delegation in the fulfilment of your task. A number of colleagues have left since I last took the floor. I would like to take this opportunity to wish them every success in their future endeavours. I would also like to extend a very warm welcome to new colleagues who have joined us recently.

Our annual session last year began on a positive note. Speaker after speaker highlighted the political changes that were taking place in Europe, and welcomed the growing spirit of dialogue and understanding that was marking the relationship between the super-Powers. There was well-founded optimism that worldwide disarmament had become an achievable objective. But all these hopes and expectations crumbled with the developments in the Persian Gulf. We were confronted with the stark reality of an end to the cold war that may have led to a more cooperative relationship between the super-Powers, but which did not imply the beginning of universal peace, nor signal a new international stability. We still appear to be a long way off from our goal of general and complete disarmament under effective internatioanl control. While the cold war infected almost all other conflicts on the globe, most of these conflicts clearly existed in their own right, and would continue to rage until each found its own solution. Many of these conflicts had the potential to involve States outside their respective regions, as was demonstrated by the Gulf war itself. We therefore believe that a regional approach to disarmament, which leads to the elimination of conflicts and the removal of tensions from various regions of the world, would reinforce the structure of world peace and security to which we are all committed.

It is gratifying to note that this regional approach to disarmament is steadily gaining ground. The importance of this concept was clearly demonstrated with the inclusion of the item "Regional approach to disarmament within the context of global security" in this year's agenda of the United Nations Disarmament Commission. We have actively participated in the discussions on this agenda item, and hope that the promise evident in the discussions of this year will be translated into concrete proposals by the time the report is finalized at the 1993 session of UNDC. We also hope that these developments will be duly reflected in our own agenda in the Conference on Disarmament.

(Mr. Kamal, Pakistan)

On a more concrete level, there is a growing recognition also that the security problems and preoccupations of States can be accorded fuller consideration in a regional context, where remedial measures can be designed which are suitable to specific situations. The success of the CSCE process in Europe bears testimony to the idea that regional consultations offer an important and relevant answer to the problems of security and arms control. If disarmament on a regional scale can succeed in a Europe which is the cradle of the cold war, then there is no reason why it cannot be pursued in other parts of the world with the same degree of success. This does not mean that the successful application of certain measures in one region can merely be transplanted into another region. It is evident that each region has distinct characteristics, but it is possible to learn from the experience of other regions, and to translate and imbibe the principles of their success with appropriate modifications.

In our own region, South Asia, we have, for many years, been promoting regional and bilateral efforts aimed at ensuring the equal and undiminished security of all States. These efforts have been supplemented by our strong belief in the utility and importance of confidence-building measures for the maintenance of regional peace and security, and for developing mutually beneficial and friendly relations among States. Even though confidence-building measures alone cannot provide a guarantee of progress towards the resolution of major disputes, they must be pursued earnestly, in order to avoid at least those crises that can result from misperceptions or lack of transparency, particularly in the military sphere. In this context, I would like to draw attention to the recent agreements concluded between Pakistan and India on advance notice of military exercises, manoeuvres and troop movements, prevention of air space violations and permitting overflights and landings of military aircraft. An agreement between Pakistan and India on the prohibition of attacks on each other's nuclear facilities, ratified earlier this year, also constitutes a significant confidence-building measure between the two countries.

Important as these measures are, they are far from being the only initiatives in our troubled region. At a time when renewed attention is being focused on the dangers of nuclear proliferation, allow me to list yet again some of the proposals initiated by Pakistan over the past two decades. In 1974, when India exploded a nuclear device, we proposed the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia, a proposal which has been repeatedly endorsed by the United Nations General Assembly ever since. In 1978, we proposed that, as a first step, India and Pakistan should issue a joint declaration renouncing the acquisition or manufacture of nuclear weapons. In 1979, we proposed an agreement with India on a system of bilateral inspection of all nuclear facilities on a reciprocal basis. In 1979 again, we proposed simultaneous acceptance of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards by India and Pakistan on all nuclear facilities. The same year we also expressed our readiness to accede to the non-proliferation Treaty, simultaneously with India. In 1987, we proposed the conclusion of a bilateral or regional nuclear test-ban treaty. The same year again, we also proposed the convening of an

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international conference on nuclear non-proliferation in South Asia, under the auspices of the United Nations, with the participation of regional and other States.

Now, on 6 June 1991, the Prime Minister of Pakistan has specifically proposed that the United States, the Soviet Union and China consult and meet with India and Pakistan to discuss and resolve the issue of nuclear proliferation in South Asia, on the basis of proposals already made, or any new ideas that may emerge. A regional non-proliferation regime, containing guarantees for non-nuclear-weapon States, and agreed to by all the regional countries, would help resolve the problem in all its dimensions, and usher in a climate of mutual trust, peace and security in South Asia, enabling the States of the region to concentrate their energies and efforts on accelerating economic development, and on the promotion of the well-being of their peoples.

Of late, increasing references have been made to the creation of a new world order, a concept which recognizes that arms proliferation was one of the major underlying causes of regional instability, and which has made it one of its central concerns. It proposes substantial arms control measures, and stresses the need for responsible behaviour by both arms recipients and suppliers in an effort to prevent dangerous regional imbalances from emerging. We have no philosophical dispute with this concept and would be glad to see it succeed. We hope, however, that the measures that have been suggested will be applied across the board, without discrimination, and that they will not legitimize or perpetuate existing regional imbalances. Many small and medium-sized States, lacking indigenous defence production capabilities, have no choice but to rely upon arms purchases from abroad to meet their essential security needs. Unless the basic causes of insecurity are eliminated from inter-State relations, nations will not be persuaded to stop acquiring arms. Arms control thus has to be pursued as a political process aimed at ensuring equal and undiminished security for all regional States at the lowest levels of armaments. We must, therefore, guard against any attempt to isolate and highlight only one element of conventional arms control, while ignoring its other important aspects.

To sum up, regional disarmament is an area which deserves much greater attention than it has received so far. We remain convinced that the successful application of this concept would contribute immensely to international peace and security. The world is, after all, composed of the sum of its parts, and if we can achieve disarmament on a regional level, then we can transform this mosaic of insecure regions into a planet of global prosperity and universal peace.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Pakistan for his statement and for the kind words addressed to me. That concludes my prescribed list of speakers for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor at this stage? I recognize the representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

Mr. HAN (Democratic People's Republic of Korea): My delegation is pleased to see that the second session of the Conference on Disarmament is concluding with a new atmosphere which all of us like very much.

The Peace and Anti-nuclear Committee of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea two days ago made a detailed public statement on the deployment of nuclear weapons in the Korean peninsula, and the Committee made it clear about the threat of those nuclear weapons. I think all of us are well aware of what I mean. Nuclear weapons have been deployed on the Korean peninsula since 1957. Since then, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has been under threat from nuclear weapons for nearly 30 years. Under this menace the Democratic People's Republic of Korea decided to be protected by international law, namely the NPT, so we joined the NPT in 1985. We expected an improvement in the situation on the Korean peninsula, but we witnessed only the increase of nuclear arsenals in South Korea and the continued, ceaseless, military manoeuvres. These manoeuvres comprised 200,000 military forces from the United States in South Korea. These exercises inform the world that these are exercises for nuclear war. Therefore, the Korean people strongly demanded the withdrawal of these nuclear weapons from South Korea and appeal to the world to join us in achieving these efforts. We had hoped that the South Korean authorities would join us to make the Korean peninsula a nuclear-weapon-free zone which we proposed to discuss, but they opposed it. Now, they did not utter about these nuclear weapons and the nuclear war threat caused by the southern part of the Korean peninsula. I want to ask them: Didn't they know about these realities? Didn't they see the danger of these nuclear weapons deployed in South Korea? More than 1,000 nuclear weapons of all kinds. Didn't they know that voices are sounded by the South Korean people as well as among the American people to withdraw? It is time to withdraw from the last point of the cold war. But now, I hear no sign from the South Korean side to make the Korean peninsula a peaceful and nuclear-free-zone. They talk nonsense. This is not only a threat to the Korean people; it threatens the security and peace of Asia as a whole. No one can imagine what will happen if these kinds of weapon explode in the region. It could easily be spread to other regions. So, if the South Korean authorities really want peace and security and harmony among Koreans, they should join us to withdraw the foreign nuclear weapons from our own soil. Of course, my delegation plans to make a statement in the future. We have a schedule, therefore I don't want to make other comments on Korean questions and bilateral problems and relations between North and South. We must speak about this when we have a chance to speak. today, I reserve my right to speak about all those questions.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for his statement. Is there any other representative who wishes to take the floor at this time? I see none and would therefore turn to other matters. The secretariat has circulated today, at my request, the timetable of meetings to be held by the Conference and its subsidiary bodies

(The President)

will not then be in session. As usual, the timetable is merely indicative and can be changed if the need arises. It seems good practice, however, to advance our work by indicating what we will be doing at the opening of the next part of the annual session. Therefore, I would like to invite you to adopt the timetable which you have there if, of course, there is no objection.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: In accordance with the timetable for this week, the Conference will hold an informal meeting on the substance of agenda item 2, "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament", immediately after this plenary meeting. I have no other business for today. I shall now adjourn the 598th plenary meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held four weeks from today, on Thursday, 25 July, at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 11.40 a.m.